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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Homeownership has always been a strong component of housing and housing policy in the United 
States.  Owning a home is considered an important social and economic indicator, as well as a symbol of 
having a stake in society and contributing to the stability to the community.  The system for producing 
housing units suitable for homeownership, and for financing home mortgages, has changed dramatically 
in recent decades.  Technology and innovations have increased speed, efficiency and volume, resulting in 
more families finding mortgage financing than ever before and new homes being produced in record 
numbers.  While homeownership rates are near all-time highs, particular demographic and economic 
populations, as well as distressed areas, lag behind.  Despite greater access to mortgage credit for most 
families and communities, increased risks, and higher costs of credit, are being shouldered by consumers.  
This paper attempts to provide an overview of U.S. housing policies related to homeownership, an 
analysis of the barriers to homeownership, and background on pressing federal policies, programs, and 
regulations that could be refined to better support homeownership.  As the Millennial Housing 
Commission considers recommendations regarding federal homeownership policy, several issues are 
paramount: 
1. What more can the federal government do to encourage and support homeownership?  
2. What can the federal government do to encourage innovations in the mortgage market, while 
adequately protecting consumers? 
3. What can the federal government do to help ensure that mortgage borrowers understand the rights 
and responsibilities of homeownership and are prepared to assume them? 
4. What can the federal government do to encourage the production and preservation of homes 
affordable to those with lower-incomes?  
Buying a home is typically the largest and most complicated financial commitment most households 
ever make.  Would-be first-time buyers face many barriers to qualify for a conventionally-priced 
mortgage, including an inability to afford monthly payments, lacking sufficient savings for a 
downpayment and closing costs, having high debts or an unstable income.  Even if they qualify, potential 
buyers may be hampered by a lack of affordable homes in a desirable area, or even information on how to 
buy a home or negotiate the best deal.  Veiled or overt discriminatory practices still employed by some in 
the real estate and financial industries also conspire against some potential homebuyers.  In combination, 
these hurdles, especially among low-income and minority populations, keep homeownership, and its 
ancillary social and economic benefits, out of reach. 
Policy makers and practitioners should understand the risks and implications of expanding 
homeownership to lower-income families.  Unlike in the rental housing market, individual families must 
be able to successfully maintain their homes and their mortgages. Individual households need to have the 
capacity to stay current on their loans and to undertake needed repairs and upkeep.  When families fail at 
homeownership, entire neighborhoods can be affected in addition to the substantial losses individual 
households must endure.  To the extent that expanding homeownership to low- and very-low income 
people is a priority, correlated issues of access banking services, personal financial management and 
education policy must be considered.   
Based on interviews with leading practitioners, focus groups and other research, a series of policy 
changes are explored.  Generally, policy prescriptions can be grouped into three categories:  
1.) Expanding the reach of mortgage markets for sustainable homeownership;  
2.) Educating and protecting consumers engaged in mortgage and home equity markets; and  
3.) Producing and preserving units suitable for affordable homeownership. 
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SUMMARY OF POLICY PROPOSALS 
1.) Expanding the reach of mortgage markets for sustainable homeownership:  
! Congress should create a blended, flexible new tax credit, allocated by state housing 
agencies for either pre-paid mortgage points for deeply-subsidized loans or to bridge 
appraisal gaps in the development of owner-occupied homes.  
! FHA should be restructured as a more independent agency, freed from the miasma of 
HUDs procurement and personnel regulations, and granted flexibility to experiment with 
private-sector partnerships. 
! Mortgage revenue bonds loan limits should be based on a simply administered formula and 
the so-called ten-year rule should be repealed, allowing more mortgages to be issued 
under the existing private activity bond cap. 
! The GSEsincluding Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan Banks and 
Ginnie Maeshould use their power in the secondary market to increase standardization in 
markets, especially in subprime lending, home improvement lending, acquisition and 
development finance, and manufactured housing lending. 
 
2.) Educating and protecting consumers engaged in mortgage and home equity markets:  
! HUDs housing counseling budget should be increased and administration of these funds 
needs improvement.  Disclosure of education should be included in settlement documents 
and federal and state agencies should work to build the capacity of the homebuyer 
education delivery system.  Federal agencies should also work together to establish 
minimum standards for homebuyer counseling and education. 
! HUD, FFIEC and other agencies should be directed to review their dissemination of 
homebuyer and mortgage lending data and invest in improvements which enhance 
usability. 
! A renewed effort is needed by HUD and the Federal Reserve to revise RESPA and TILA to 
make disclosures simpler and more reliable, while also increasing cost-efficiency of closing 
and settlement. 
 
3.) Producing and preserving units suitable for affordable homeownership: 
! Barriers to placing manufactured units in urban or other developments should be reduced 
and states that do not recognize manufactured homes on leased land as real estate should 
change their laws.  Lending for manufactured homes needs attention by federal agencies 
and regulators, particularly home loans classified as personal property.  
! Borrowers without home equity need affordable sources of home improvement loans to 
sustain homeownership.  FHA and mortgage revenue bonds programs should be revised 
for use in home improvement finance.  
! Housing policies and programs need to focus on strategies for teaching economic literacy 
and helping families maintain their homes and their finances.  Existing homeowners need 
more access to training on how to maintain their home, as well as support to lead 
community improvement activities. 
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ACRONYMS USED IN THIS DOCUMENT 
 
ACA Asset Control Areas 
AHECI American Homebuyer Education and Counseling Institute 
AHP Affordable Housing Program (of the Federal Home Loan Bank System) 
APR Annual Percentage Rate 
BEA  Bank Enterprise Awards  
CDBG Community Development Block Grant 
CDFI  Community Development Financial Institutions  
CMOs  Collateralized Mortgage Obligations 
EAH  Employer Assisted Housing 
FASIT Financial Asset Securitization Investment Trust 
FDIC Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
FFIEC  Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council  
FHA  Federal Housing Administration 
FHFB Federal Housing Finance Board 
FHLB  Federal Home Loan Bank 
FICO Fair Issacs Company  
FIRREA Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 
GSEs  Government Sponsored Enterprises 
HHS Department of Health and Human Services 
HMDA Home Mortgage Disclosure Act 
HOEPA Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act  
HOME HOME Investment Partnerships Act Block Grants 
HOPE VI Public Housing Recovery Program 
HUD   Department of Housing and Urban Development 
IDAs Individual Development Accounts 
IRA Individual Retirement Account 
IRS Internal Revenue Service 
LIHTC Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
LTV Loan-to-Value (ratio) 
MBS Mortgage-backed securities 
MCC  Mortgage Credit Certificate  
MI Mortgage Insurance 
MPF  Mortgage Partnership Finance 
MPP  Mortgage Partnership Program 
MRB Mortgage Revenue Bond 
NCSHA  National Conference of State Housing Agencies 
OFHEO  Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight 
REMIC  Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit 
RESPA  Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act  
RHS Rural Housing Service (also called Farmers Home or Rural Development) 
TANF Temporary Assistance to Needy Families 
TILA Truth In Lending Act 
TOTAL Technology Open To All Lenders 
USDA  United States Department of Agriculture 
VA  Veterans Administration  
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SECTION 1: THE ROLE OF HOMEOWNERSHIP IN THE U.S.  
Over 70 million families own homes in the U.S. For most families, buying a home is their largest 
investment and greatest source of wealth.  Owner-occupied houses furnish a stable place to raise children 
and a secure base from which to establish social networks.  Resident owners typically are invested in their 
property, work to improve their neighborhood and are more likely to participate in the democratic system.  
And, as families buy and build homes, economic benefitssuch as business revenue and jobsare 
generated for the broader community. 
• Homes are crucial to low-income families for financial asset building.  The median wealth of a low-
income homeowner under age 65 is 12 times that of a similar renter. 1 Over 66 percent of the total net 
worth of low-income homeowners is stored as home equity.2 
• Homeowners are less likely to move, staying in a community up to four times longer than renters. 
When neighbors stay in one place longer, they have more time to get to know one another and to 
establish social networks. Businesses also benefit, as employees with owner-occupied housing are 
more likely to form a stable workforce. 3  
• Homeowners are more willing to contribute to political campaigns and to lobby public officials than 
similar renters.4  
• Homeowners are also 16 percent more likely to belong to parent-teacher organizations, block clubs 
and other community organizations.5  
• Children of homeowners are 116 percent more likely to go to college than the children of similar 
renter families, even after controlling for age, income and length of stay in the community, and 59 
percent more likely to become homeowners themselves.6  
• The construction of 1,000 single-family homes supports nearly 2,500 full-time jobs in construction 
and construction-related industries, $80 million in wages, and $43 million in combined federal, state 
and local revenues and fees.7  
• Homeownership also provides individuals an investment in real estate while benefiting from having a 
place to live.  Nationally, home equity build-up from home price appreciation was more than $700 
billion in 2000 alone.8  Home price appreciation is not risk-free, but exhibits lower volatility than 
stock or bond prices.9  
 
Five million families purchase homes annually.  An extensive cast of institutions and actors provide 
for the delivery of homeownership opportunities.  Potential buyers typically rely on a real estate agent to 
help them search for a unit and on private appraisers, attorneys and inspectors to provide objective 
judgements at various stages of the home-purchase transaction.  Mortgage brokers and financial 
institutions evaluate applicants for mortgage loans and provide access to mortgage capital, often through 
secondary markets to investors on Wall Street.   
                                                          
1 Federal Reserve Board 1995 Survey of Consumer Finances, tabulated by Joint Center for Housing Studies. 
2 Ibid. 
3  Richard K. Green and Michelle J. White, Measuring the Benefits of Homeowning: Effects on Children, Working paper, 
Center for the Study of the Economy and the State, Chicago, 1994. 
4 Peter Rossi and Eleanor Weber, The Social Benefits of Homeownership, Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1996. 
5 Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Home Owners Better Citizens? Joint Center 
For Housing Studies Working paper W97-3, 1997. 
6 Thomas P. Boehm, and Alan Schlottmann, Does Homeownership By Parents Have an Economic Impact on Their Children? 
Working paper, Dept. of Finance, University of Tennessee at Knoxville, 1999. 
7 Paul Emrath, Local Economic Impact of Home Building. Housing Economics, Vol. 45, No. 3, March 1997. 
8 The National Association of REALTORS estimate. 
9 The standard deviation of investment returns for stocks is 20 percent, for bonds it is 9 percent, but for owner-occupied housing, 
it is only 4 percent. 
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The public sector provides a regulatory framework to protect consumers and increase efficiency.  In 
addition, public subsidies are offered to special populations in the form of below-market interest rate 
loans, grants for downpayments, and funds for the development or renovation of units suitable for 
homeownership.  The public sector also provides tax advantages to mortgage borrowers and investors, as 
well as credit enhancements, implicit and explicit, for segments of the mortgage market.   
The nonprofit sector also plays a role by serving as a third-party ombudsman and educator to potential 
buyers navigating the process, as well as a provider of financial assistance.  Nonprofits also develop units 
suitable for ownership, using subsidies to build in markets where private-sector developers cannot do so 
profitably.  In many cases, nonprofits are the only source of post-purchase services some families need to 
sustain homeownership.  Through board governance and accountability to residents, nonprofits also can 
make sure the long-run needs of neighborhoods are addressed, as well as be a force for pluralism by 
representing minority interests in community development.  
Together this system of public-private relationships supports an expansion of homeownership to an 
increasing number of families each year.  Nevertheless, barriers to homeownership remain for some 
families and neighborhoods.   
 
SECTION 2: BARRIERS TO HOMEOWNERSHIP 
While homeownership rates are at all-time highs nationally, higher-income families are much more 
likely to own homes than lower-income families (Table 1).  Only 48 percent of very low-income 
households live in owner-occupied homes, as opposed to 67 percent of all households, and 88 percent of 
high-income households.  Moreover, homeownership rates are lower in central cities across all income 
groups.  Overall, there is a 24-percentage point difference between central-city and suburban 
homeownership rates, and even a 20-point difference among families in the same low-income range.10 
There are substantial gaps in homeownership attainment between races, even controlling for marriage, 
central-city location age and education.  For example, a white, married household under 50 years of age 
living in a central city, without a high school education, is just as likely own a home as an African 
American household in the same circumstance, with a college degree (Appendix Table A).  
Table 1 
Homeownership Rates by Income and Location 
Percent of Households Owning a Home 
Income as a Percent of Area Median Income 
 Very Low 
Income 
(Less than 
50%) 
Low Income 
(51% to 
80%) 
Moderate 
Income 
(81% to 
120%) 
High 
Income 
(Over 
120%) 
All  Households 
Central City 30.7% 44.5% 58.5% 79.5% 49.8% 
Suburb 56.1% 64.3% 76.1% 90.3% 73.8% 
Non-Metro 61.0% 69.7% 78.2% 90.8% 75.4% 
All Areas 47.6% 58.9% 71.9% 87.9% 66.9% 
Source: 1999 American Housing Survey, authors tabulations  
 
                                                          
10 Several factors that contribute to the homeownership gap between cities and suburbs, including a lack of single-family 
detached housing units in urban areas, a lack of creditworthiness among urban residents, and racial segregation/discrimination. 
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There are several reasons a renter household may be prevented from buying a home: 
I. Lack of income to afford the monthly payment of principal, interest, taxes and insurance; 
II. Lack of net savings to put into a downpayment and closing costs and/or high debt; 
III. Poor credit history, which results in an increased interest rate, exacerbating income constraints; 
IV. Lack of information on how to shop for a home and apply for a loan; and, 
V. Lack of quality affordable units in a desirable location. 
 
Each of these barriers is introduced below, with a brief note as to which federal policies respond to this 
issue.  Each of these barriers and policies is explored in further detail in Sections 3 through 5. 
 
Figure 1:  Homeownership Barriers and Policy Reponses 
Barrier to Homeownership Federal Policy Response 
Lack of Income Mortgage Revenue Bonds, Mortgage Credit Certificates Government 
Sponsored Enterprises, Deductibility of Mortgage Interest, Section 8 
Homeownership Option 
Lack of Wealth and/or High Debt FHA/VA/RHS Mortgage Insurance, HOME, CDBG, CDFI 
Downpayment Grants and Loans 
Poor Credit History FHA/VA/RHS Mortgage Insurance, Mortgage Revenue-backed Loans 
Lack of Information Truth in Lending Act and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
Disclosures, HUD Section 108 Counseling Grants 
Lack up Housing Supply National Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards, 
HOME, CDBG, CDFI Grants and Loans 
 
 
A.) Income Barriers to Homeownership 
According to Census data, in 1995 approximately 90 percent of rental households could not afford to 
purchase a modestly priced home using a 30-year fixed-rate mortgage (Table 2).11  Prudent mortgage 
underwriters will only allow a borrower to put about one-third of pre-tax income towards the payment of 
housing costs, including hazard insurance and property taxes.  As a result, potential buyers are limited in 
the amount they can afford to pay by their housing debt-to-income ratio.  Given a target house price and 
interest rate, however, Census analysis shows only two percent were prevented from purchasing a home 
priced at half of the median price (the lowest quartile) by income constraints alone.  Income alone is not a 
primary barrier to homeownership. 
Current Federal Policy Response: Federal policies seek to reduce income barriers to homeownership 
with below-market-rate loan programs, such as the Mortgage Revenue Bond (MRB) and Mortgage Credit 
Certificate (MCC) programs.  Because many buyers require credit enhancements that add costs to 
monthly payments, such as mortgage insurance, many first-time buyers need deeper interest rate subsidies 
than typically can be offered by mortgage revenue bonds.  A small volume of substantially below-market 
interest rate lending is available through special CRA-motivated bank programs, community-based 
nonprofit lenders and local governments, but combined this is a relatively small, and unevenly distributed 
portion of the market. The RHS direct 502 loan program provides loans at rates as low as one percent, for 
example, but only funded 15,000 loans in 1999, two-thirds of its level in the early 1990s. 
                                                          
11 Howard Savage, Who Can Afford to Buy A House? US Census, 1999.  Based on a conventional mortgage at a 30-year fixed 
rate. The Census intends to revise this study in late 2002 using 1997 data. 
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The tax code also allows borrowers to deduct mortgage interest and real estate taxes, which, if a 
taxpayers income is high enough to justify itemizing deductions, can help reduce tax liabilities, and thus 
increase income available for monthly payments.  However, most lower-income taxpayers do not have 
enough income or tax liability to use these deductions.  The tax code provides little support for income-
constrained homebuyers. 
Federal support, implicit or explicit, for government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), such as Ginnie Mae, 
Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae and the Federal Home Loan Banks, also help facilitate the efficient flow of 
mortgage credit to borrowers, theoretically reducing interest costs and increasing affordability.  Some 
analysts argue that few of the advantages granted to the GSEs, or in the tax code, are actually transferred 
to buyers, but instead are priced into the market or captured by other entities.  While the incidence of 
these benefits is being debated, these aspects of federal homeownership policy theoretically contribute to 
overcoming income barriers to homeownership.   
Recently HUD has allowed renters using Section 8 rental assistance vouchers to apply the subsidy 
towards a mortgage.  Fewer than 200 families took advantage of this innovative program in 2001, in part 
because of reluctance by Section 8 administrators to participate in the programs.  However, this program 
could allow a portion of the 78,000 Section 8-assisted households with sufficient income to continue on a 
path to self-sufficiency by becoming homeowners.12 
 
Table 2 
Reason Home Priced at Half of Median Cannot Be Afforded (1995) 
Households 
(millions) 
Percent 
Current Renters 21,424 100.0% 
Current Renters Who Can Afford 2,120 9.9% 
Current Renters Who Cannot Afford  19,304 90.1% 
..Reason Cannot Afford:   
Income Barrier Only- Lack income 413 2.1% 
Wealth Barrier - Debt level too high 2,402 12.4% 
Wealth Barrier  Lack downpayment 2,991 15.5% 
Income & Wealth - Lack income & Debt too high 9,323 48.3% 
Income & Wealth - Lack income & Lack downpayment 4,175 21.6% 
Total 19,304 100.0% 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census,  
<http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/hsgaffrd.html> Table 3-5 
 
 
B.) Wealth Barriers to Homeownership 
Mortgage loans typically require borrowers to make some cash investment in the deal, and also limit 
borrower total debt load, including non-housing consumer debts.  Census data in Table 2 show 28 percent 
of renters cannot afford a modestly-priced home because they lack savings (15.5 percent) or have high 
debt loads (12.4 percent).  In order to accumulate savings, households must consume less and save more 
(or receive inheritances or gifts from relatives or other benefactors).  The average first-time homebuyer 
under 35 years of age takes 2.8 years to acquire enough assets to afford to buy a home.13  Because renters 
are typically lower-income, and have to spend much of their earnings for rent, health care and food, they 
often use consumer debt, credit cards and installment loans.  The result is that many renter families are 
strapped with high debt loads and little savings. 
                                                          
12 Based on non-elderly, non-disabled households with earned income over $10,600 from HUDs Picture of Subsidized 
Households, 1998. 
13Gary V. Englehardt and Christopher J. Mayer, Intergenerational Transfers, Borrowing Constraints and Savings Behavior: 
Evidence from the Housing Market, Journal of Urban Economics. Vol. 44, pp 135-157, 1998. 
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Given the close relationship between wealth and income, it may not be surprising approximately 70 
percent of renters are prevented from purchasing a home by both income and wealth barriersespecially 
lacking income and having high debt loads.  Typically, a household needs sufficient income in order to be 
able to defer some portion of its consumption into savings or to pay down debts.  Thus, having 
accumulated savings and low debts is correlated with having a higher income.  The biggest barrier for 
these renter households, having a low income and high debt, has likely been exacerbated in recent years 
as use of consumer credit has expanded, especially among lower-income families. 
Wealth barriers can be overcome by lowering downpayments for borrowers who lack savings.  
Likewise, loan underwriters can allow borrowers to have higher levels of consumer debt and still qualify 
for a mortgage.  However, when loans are approved with low downpayments, lenders have less of a 
cushion in the event of a decline in house prices if the borrower defaults.  To protect themselves in the 
case of a default, lenders often require mortgage insurance on low-downpayment loans, which raises 
monthly payments and closing costs, adding to income barriers.   
Current Federal Policy Response: The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has played a 
significant role in homeownership policy by provide mortgage insurance on loans with low 
downpayments and high debt-to-income ratios.  Farmers Home, now called Rural Housing Service 
(RHS), and the Veterans Administration (VA), created similar loan-guarantee programs.  Because such 
mortgages typically involve higher interest rates and larger mortgage balances, however, these programs 
tend to raise monthly payments, unless combined with below-market rate loans.  Federal block grant 
programs, such as HOME funds, and in some cases CDBG, may be used to provide grants or loans to 
qualified borrowers for downpayments and closing costs.  These direct subsidy programs can help reduce 
both income and wealth barriers, but are limited in scale.  Even smaller in scale, revolving loan funds 
administered by local governments, as well as by nonprofit agencies funded by the federal Community 
Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) Fund and other sources, also provide low-cost loans to 
borrowers ineligible for loans in the private market. Federal tax policy also allows penalty-free IRA 
withdrawals for first-time buyers, which can be used for overcoming the barrier of insufficient savings for 
downpayment and closing costs. 
 
C.) Credit History Barriers to Homeownership 
Decades ago the consumer finance market developed models to predict loan default behavior given 
borrower characteristics and past credit usage.  Over time, credit bureau depositories have developed, 
offering extensive details on how individuals access and use credit cards, lines of credit, installment loans 
and other extensions of credit.14  Credit scores, often called FICO or Beacon scores based on the names of 
the issuing company, condense credit bureau information into a single number.  While an individuals 
credit score depends on a number of factors, high-risk scores tend to be associated with a history of late 
payments, maximized credit lines and repeated applications for additional credit.15 
Credit scores are now commonly used to assess mortgage applicants.  FICO scores generally range 
from 300 to 850, with higher scores indicating better credit history.  Mortgage applicants with FICO 
scores above 660 are likely to have acceptable credit and can be quickly underwritten.  For applicants 
with FICO scores between 620 and 660, lenders typically perform careful underwriting, scrutinizing 
traditional factors.  FICO scores below 620 indicate high risk, and even after a particularly thorough 
review are unlikely to be approved by conventional lenders.16  Even prior to these metrics, however, loan 
underwriters assessed if applicants ever had a bankruptcy or any overdue accounts when reviewing loan 
                                                          
14 The three repositories are Equifax Credit Information Services, Trans Union Credit Information Company and TRW 
Information Systems and Services. 
15 Recently, credit bureaus and scoring agencies have changed policies restricting access to credit data and scores.  Consumers 
may obtain this information on their own accounts by request and via the Internet, for example www.myfico.com. 
16 These FICO score ranges are approximate.  Individual lenders and loan products use a variety of cutoff scores. 
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applications.  Quantitative credit scores, however, are easily applied to computerized, automated 
underwriting systems and have proven more predictive and efficient. 
According to Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, the reason most frequently cited for the 
denial of a single-family mortgage home purchase loan is a poor credit history.  Moreover, half of African 
American applicants denied loans were rejected for this reason.  Low-income and minority households 
tend to have reduced job security, lower levels of savings and higher debt.  Due to the intergenerational 
nature of poverty and historic patterns of economic discrimination, many of these families also may not 
be able to turn to parents or relatives for financial support.  The problem is made worse because many 
lower-income and minority neighborhoods do not have mainstream lending institutions.  Check cashing 
stores, pawnshops, and rent-to-own stores proliferate.  Since 1993 the number of check cashing facilities 
nationally has doubled, many offering short-term, payday loans at high rates.17  Nationally, 12 million 
households do not have any conventional banking relationships, including an estimated 44 percent of 
African-American renters earning under $40,000.18  This lack of a banking relationship often prevents 
these households from establishing adequate credit histories, as they turn to expensive fringe financial 
services with onerous terms.  Table 3 shows evidence that lower-income areas, and minority individuals, 
tend to have lower median credit scores. 
Table 3 
Median Equifax Credit Score For Zip Code 
Poverty Level of 
"Neighborhood" 
All 
Individuals 
Minority 
Individuals 
0-5% 815 780 
5-10% 783 783 
10-25% 759 763 
25% + 691 706 
Source: Robert B. Avery, Raphael W. Bostic, Paul S. Calem, 
Glenn B. Canner, "The Distribution of Credit Scores: Findings 
and Implications for the Provision of Financial Services. 
Proceedings of the 33rd annual Conference on Bank Structure 
and Competition, May 1997. 
As a result, low- and moderate-income households are more likely to have credit records that 
disqualify them from obtaining a prime-priced home mortgage loan.  Freddie Macs analysis of the 
distribution of credit-bureau scores shows African-American borrowers are three times as likely to have 
FICO scores below 620 as white borrowers, and Latinos about twice as likely.  Borrowers earning less 
than 80 percent of area median income are more likely to have scores below 620 than higher-income 
borrowers. However, Freddie Macs analysis also shows that the ability of FICO scores to predict loan 
performance is equally accurate across income and racial groups.19   
One source often cited for contributing to high debt is student loans.  One in five households currently 
hold a student loan.  A 1998 General Accounting Office report found 52 percent of undergraduate college 
students took out a loan in 1995, compared to 41 percent in 1992.  The average debt per student rose from 
$7,800 to $9,700 in real terms during the same period.  About one-third (31 percent) of borrowers pay 
more than 10 percent of their monthly income for a student loan, but the median monthly debt-to-income 
ratio has remained 8 percent for the last decade.  Nevertheless, 40 percent of student loan borrowers with 
higher debt burdens reported hold this debt delayed their decision to purchase a home.20  
Current Federal Policy Response:  While credit scores are a newer phenomenon in the mortgage 
application process, poor credit histories have always been a barrier to homeownership for some families.  
Federal policy has addressed this barrier primarily by offering mortgage insurance and supporting 
                                                          
17 John Caskey, Lower Income Americans, Higher Cost Financial Services. Working paper, Filene Research Institute & Center 
for Credit Union Research, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1997. 
18 Federal Reserve Board tabulations of 1999 Survey of Consumer Finances. 
19 Freddie Mac, 1997  < http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/moseley/moseidx.htm>. 
20 Susan Choy and Sonya Geis, National Center for Education Statistics, 1997. 
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mortgage revenue bond-backed loans to borrowers with credit problems. For example, FHAs 203(b) 
single family program provides insurance for mortgage borrowers within a shorter time after a serious 
loan delinquency or bankruptcy than private-sector mortgage insurers.  Federal mortgage insurance 
programs have been slow, however, to use credit scores to assess borrowers and price insurance 
premiumsFHA has is still in the early stages of developing its TOTAL (Technology Open To All 
Lenders) scoring system and has no risk-based pricing procedures.  In contrast, technological tools and 
precise pricing models have been rapidly adopted in the private sector.  Some observers suspect private 
lenders are able to use their technological advantage to quickly screen borrowers, choose those with the 
most favorable credit history, and leave higher-risk borrowers to government programs. 
 
D.) Information Barriers to Homeownership 
There is evidence to suggest that a significant segment of potential buyers self-select out of 
homeownership due to fear of rejection, confusion about the complexities of the process or 
misunderstandings about their financial status.21  Even if they can afford a home, minority and low-
income renters often lack the confidence to try to buy a home.  Freddie Macs survey of Consumer 
Knowledge and Confidence revealed that only half (49 percent) of African-Americans with credit scores 
that would qualify for loans perceive themselves as qualified.  The historical legacy of institutional 
discrimination may also affect many minority applicants, who continue to be rejected at much higher rates 
than white applicants.  According to 2000 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, conventional 
home purchase loan denial rates were 22 percent for white applicants, 31 percent for Latino applicants 
and 45 percent for African-American applicants.  Studies show some of this differential can be explained 
by the income and employment history of applicants, the type of property involved, as well as credit 
quality.  But the experience of peers, even if based in accurate economic differences, cannot help but 
influence applicants attitudes.  Some renters are unwilling to apply for a loan because they expect to be 
rejected and do not wish to be subjected to such an experience. 
Current Federal Policy Response: Federal policies seek to overcome information barriers by 
providing support for agencies engaged in pre-purchase homebuyer education and counseling, through 
HUD and state housing finance agencies, as well as outreach to underserved communities through public 
housing authorities, and national nonprofit intermediaries, such as the Neighborhood Reinvestment 
Corporation.  Laws regulating information provided to home purchasers, such as the Truth in Lending Act 
and Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, provide some disclosure documents to borrowers during the 
buying process regarding their rights and options.  To an extent, the Community Reinvestment Act 
encourages financial institutions to perform outreach and education to undeserved markets regarding the 
availability of mortgage loans, and bank regulatory agencies provide resources and information about 
homeownership to the public.  HUDs National Homeownership Strategy and annual Homeownership 
Week are examples of national outreach and marketing projects.  Likewise, research, publications and 
marketing by the GSEs also help inform the public about homeownership opportunities. Overall, policy 
efforts to break down informational barriers are less focused than other federal policies regarding 
homeownership, but involve a high degree of partnership between sectors and institutions. 
 
E.) Affordable Supply Barriers to Homeownership 
There is a delicate balance between growth in home-owning households and the number of housing 
units suitable for homeownership in each metropolitan housing market.  Some markets have a constrained 
ability to produce new units as population grows, due to geographic or regulatory boundaries.  For 
homeownership rates to increase within a static housing stock, rental units (or more rarely, vacant or 
commercial units) must be converted to owner-occupied units.  Because of a preference for single-family 
                                                          
21 Michael S. Ratner, "Many Routes to Homeownership: An Ethnographic Study of Minority and Immigrant Experiences," 
Housing Policy Debate, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp 103-145, 1996. 
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detached units (81 percent live in such units, Table 4), the type of housing units occupied by renters 
determines how units are converted from renter to owner.  In some markets, single-family rental units can 
be converted to owner-occupied homes.  In other markets, multifamily units can be converted to owner-
occupied cooperative housing or condominiums.  However, conversions are not the primary mechanism 
for increasing homeownership rates, because the overall pattern in the U.S. is for a growing, rather than 
static, housing stock.  New units are being built for existing move-up homeowners, allowing existing 
units to be occupied by first-time buyers.  Because of the fixed costs involved in building new houses, 
and the relatively higher profit margins involved in building higher-cost homes, very few affordable 
homes are being produced today, with the exception of manufactured homes.22  The barrier confronting 
first-time buyers, however, is whether they can afford new units, converted units or existing units suitable 
for homeownership.  Local housing standards, codes and environmental regulations all tend to increase 
the cost of housing.23  Likewise, local zoning tends to limit the development of affordable units to 
specific, often least desirable, areas. 
Current Federal Policy Response: Although federal policy has little influence over local zoning or 
housing codes, the National Manufactured Home Construction and Safety Standards, or so called HUD-
code, facilitates production of affordable owner-occupied units by establishing a national code that 
preempts local codes.  The HUD-code allows the use of assembly-line technology to reduce production 
costs.  Through the use of HOME and CDBG funds, additional units suitable for homeownership may be 
newly built, renovated or converted from vacant, rental or commercial space.  Likewise, support for 
community development nonprofits to develop affordable units produces a small number of owner-
occupied homes annually.  Generally, however, there is little federal policy support for creating 
affordable single-family homes. 
Table 4 
Profile of U.S. Housing Stock (in thousands) 
Units in Structure All 
Occupied 
% All 
Occupied
% of 
Owner 
Occupied 
Units 
% of Units 
built/placed 
in last 4 
years 
% of 
Central-city 
Owner 
Occupied 
Units 
% of Suburb 
Owner- 
Occupied 
Units 
1, detached 64,536 59.0% 80.5% 67.7% 77.4% 81.6% 
1, attached 8,572 7.8% 2.1% 0.7% 4.6% 1.6% 
2 to 4 8,572 7.8% 2.1% 0.7% 4.6% 1.6% 
5 or more 15,947 14.6% 2.4% 1.4% 4.5% 2.5% 
Manufactured Home 6,785 6.2% 8.1% 24.9% 1.7% 7.0% 
Cooperatives 588 0.5% 0.5% 0.1% 1.5% 0.3% 
Condominiums 4,438 4.1% 4.3% 4.4% 5.7% 5.4% 
 109,438 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: 1999 American Housing Survey, authors tabulations 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
22 Malpezzi, Stephen and Richard K. Green, "What Has Happened to the Bottom of the Housing Market?", Urban Studies, Vol. 
33, Issue 10, pp. 1807-1820, 1996. 
23 The 1991 Advisory Committee on Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing found code regulations enforce a minimum level 
of housing quality, truncating the process of units reaching more affordable levels. 
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SECTION 3: EXTENDING THE REACH OF MORTGAGE MARKETS 
Homeownership rates today are over 68 percent, due in part to economic expansion, but also because 
of an innovative mortgage industry and tightened oversight and regulation.  Until the 1930s, homeowners 
who financed their purchases typically made a downpayment of at least 40 percent, paying only interest 
for three to five years, until a final "balloon" payment of principal was due.  In the Depression, defaults 
spiraled as borrowers could not make final balloon payments, and lenders were unwilling to roll loans 
into another balloon loan.  The National Housing Act of 1934 created the FHA insurance program to 
protect lenders from the risk of default on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages, essentially placing the full 
faith and credit of the U.S. government behind the borrower.  In 1938, Congress created Fannie Mae to 
purchase FHA-insured mortgages from lenders to increase liquidity in the market.  The Federal Home 
Loan Bank system was also created to exchange capital among regional lending markets.  After World 
War II, Veterans Affairs began to guarantee low-downpayment mortgages made to veterans; similarly the 
USDA created the Farmers Home (now Rural Housing Service) loan guarantee.  In 1968, the Housing 
and Urban Development Act established Ginnie Mae as part of HUD to guarantee, or wrap, FHA, VA, 
and Rural Housing Service loans sold by private lenders.  This act also re-chartered Fannie Mae as a 
stockholder-owned, non-government corporation to purchase conventional loans.  In 1970, Congress 
similarly chartered Freddie Mac to buy conventional mortgage loans from federally insured financial 
institutions.24 
The first mortgage-backed security, wrapped by Ginnie Mae, was issued in 1970.  Investors initially 
shunned mortgage bonds due to their quirky interest rate-driven prepayment behavior.25  In the 1980s, 
collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs) were developed, spawning a flood of innovations in 
mortgage-backed securities.  The Tax Reform Act of 1986 created Real Estate Mortgage Investment 
Conduits (REMICs), a vehicle that minimizes tax liabilities of CMOs, further accelerating the sources of 
funds for mortgage loans.  
Savings and loans (often called thrifts) dominated the growing mortgage market in the 1970s, 
originating long-term mortgages financed with shorter-term deposits.  Today, traditional depository-based 
thrifts and credit unions share the market with commercial banks and mortgage bankers, which depend 
not on deposits but on raising funds in capital markets.  Financial institutions have undergone extensive 
consolidation since the 1980sfrom over 13,000 institutions to less than 8,000.26  The top 10 largest 
banks have moved from controlling one-quarter to almost one-half of all loans in the last decade (Figure 
2).  Meanwhile, the shift away from depositories has contributed to a decline in the share of mortgage 
originations made by local (within 30 miles of the borrower) institutions to decline from 76 percent to 53 
percent.27  Credit scoring and automatic underwriting have spurred a system of over 30,000 independent 
mortgage brokers.  The share of originations involving a mortgage broker has increased from near zero in 
the 1980s to more than half (55 percent) of all residential mortgage originations in 2000.28  
Advances in technology have improved the capacity of lenders to create highly-customized loan 
products, delivered at a high speed and easily made liquid in the secondary market.  Automated 
underwriting systems were developed in the early 1990s by the GSEs, larger financial institutions and 
private mortgage insurance companies.  The efficiencies created by these systems save $300 to $650 in 
costs, as well as speed processing and increase flexibility.29  By screening the majority of applications 
with automated systems, underwriters have more time to review special cases.  While removing human 
subjectivity from the process makes lending decisions less susceptible to bias, some critics worry these 
                                                          
24 For more detail on the history and function of mortgage finance, see Marsha Courchane, David Nickerson and Frank Nothaft, 
Evolution of the Housing Finance System in America, Working paper, 2001. 
25 As interest rates decline, borrowers pre-pay their mortgage, returning principal to investors. Investors no longer receive cash 
flows from interest and are forced to reinvest their funds in the market at a time when rates are lower. 
26 http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/staffstudies/174/default.htm 
27 Federal Reserve Board Survey of Consumer Finances, 1995. 
28 "Mortgage Brokers 2000," Wholesale Access: Mortgage Research and Consulting, July 5, 2001.  60% was projected for 2001. 
29 Automated Underwriting: Making Mortgage Lending Simpler and Fairer for Americas Families, Freddie Mac, 1996. 
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systems may not be well suited for some groups of borrowers because important criteria may be 
omitted.30 
 
Figure 2 
Share of Assets (Loans) by 10 Largest Bank Holding Cos.
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A.) The Growth of Subprime Mortgage Lending 
Subprime mortgage lending has accelerated in the last decade, particularly to minority and low-income 
households.  These loans, also called B and C lending based on the A to D credit quality continuum, 
serve borrowers who do not meet the underwriting standards of the conforming market, which is also 
called prime, A, or conventional lending.  Starting as specialized loans allowing existing homeowners 
to tap into home equity for cash or debt consolidation, the subprime market today provides loans for 
purchase, refinance and home improvement.  The hallmark of these loans is higher interest rates and fees, 
which compensate for increased risks, such as high loan-to-value ratios or debt ratios and low credit 
scores.  Depending on the relative risk involved, subprime loans might charge 1 to 10 percent more than 
conventional rates.  Subprime lenders initially operated as consumer finance firms, offering loans 
nationally through mortgage brokers.  More and more, major financial institutions of all types have 
purchased or created subprime lending units, enticed both by high returns and the ability to tap new 
markets.  Since the conventional market may be reaching saturation in some areas, lower-quality 
borrowers, especially those who are close to conventional risk, are an important growth market.  Perhaps 
surprisingly, most subprime borrowers, 57 percent, are A-minus risk quality, and 25 percent are B risk 
quality.31 
From 1993 to 2000, home purchase loan originations by subprime mortgage specialists grew by 83 
percent, compared to 29 percent growth in total mortgage market originations.  In that same period, 
subprime originations went from 1.3 percent to 5.3 percent of the total purchase market (Appendix Table 
F).  In 1993, subprime lenders made less than 2 percent of all loans in low-income minority 
neighborhoods.  By 1998, that number had grown to over 15 percent of all loans, and 40 percent of 
                                                          
30 See M. Cary Collins, Keith D. Harvey, Peter J. Nigro, The Influence of Bureau Scores, Customized Scores and Judgmental 
Review on the Bank Underwriting Decision Making Process Working paper from Changing Financial Markets and 
Community Development, Federal Reserve System's Second Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C. 
April 5-6, 2001. 
31 Mortgage Banking May 2001, page 28. 
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refinanced loans.32 Subprime specialists made 51 percent of refinance loans in predominantly African-
American neighborhoods, compared to only nine percent in predominantly white neighborhoods.33 
Subprime specialists made almost 16 percent of home purchase loans to African Americans in 1999.34 
Central to the issue of subprime lending is ensuring borrowers are offered the lowest-cost credit for 
which they qualify, regardless of their race, income or where they live.  One study shows that up to 30 
percent of borrowers taking out high-cost subprime loans could have qualified for lower cost mortgages.35   
For a $70,000 mortgage, the difference in cost between an 8 percent interest rate and an 11.5 percent 
interest rate is $2,097 in the first year alone.36  
To the extent that subprime lenders are gaining market share because of a lack of competition from 
prime lenders, creditworthy borrowers may be facing higher costs for mortgages than necessary.  
Consumer advocates are concerned that as subprime lenders become subsidiaries of larger institutions, 
borrowers maybe pushed into higher-interest rate subprime loans than lower-revenue prime loans.  
There is also some evidence that subprime loans are priced higher than the credit risks involved. 
Freddie Mac conducted an analysis finding one pool of loans made by a subprime lender was priced 
higher than these loans would be priced in the conventional market.  Even after allowing for possible 
differences in borrower quality, collateral risks and costs, the subprime loans in this pool had an 
unexplained interest rate premium of 100 basis points on average.37  
 
B.) The Role of Federal Policy in Extending the Reach of Mortgage Markets 
Since 1993, the number of home purchase loans made to low-income borrowers has grown 87 percent, 
compared to 37 percent growth for all borrowers.  Lending to African Americans grew 89 percent, 
relative to 25 percent growth in loans to whites.38  Overall, it seems some mix of public policy and the 
marketplace has promoted better access to mortgages.  While more low-income and minority families 
than ever before are able to get mortgage loans, many are also paying higher rates for their credit than 
conventional borrowers.  A nagging issue is how to promote innovation and encourage credit flows to 
nontraditional borrowers and communities, without subjecting families to undue risks.  Federal policies 
aimed at extending the reach of mortgage markets have five avenues (1) credit enhancements, (2) 
below-market interest rates, (3) regulation, (4) government-sponsored enterprises and (5) tax policy. 
 
1.) Credit Enhancement: FHA, VA and RHS Mortgage Insurance  
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mutual mortgage insurance fund has existed for almost 70 
years in an effort to provide federal support to the mortgage market in serving targeted populations.  FHA 
has helped millions of Americans, especially low-income and minority families, purchase homes by 
providing mortgage insurance for loans that allow more flexible underwriting than is available from the 
conventional market.  It also has helped stabilize recessionary markets when private mortgage insurers 
stop endorsing policies. FHA currently insures a total of about 7 million loans valued at nearly $400 
billion.  These obligations are protected by FHA's Mutual Mortgage Insurance Fund, which is sustained 
entirely by borrower premiums (See Appendix Table B for a profile of FHAs portfolio).  
                                                          
32 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act Data, 1993-1998, tabulated by HUD. 
33 Harold L. Bunce, Debbie Gruenstein, Christopher E. Herbert, Randall M. Scheessele, Subprime Foreclosures: The Smoking 
Gun of Predatory Lending?  HUD Working paper. 2000. 
34 Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University State of the Nations Housing 2000 
35 Hugh Mahoney and Peter Zorn, Promise of Automated Underwriting SMM Vol. 13, November 1996. 
<http://www.freddiemac.com/finance/smm/nov96/html/nov96.htm> 
36 Bunce, et al. 
37 Howard Lax, Michael Manti, Paul Raca, and Peter Zorn, Subprime Lending: An Investigation of Economic Efficiency, 
February 25, 2000. 
38 Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council tabulations of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data. 
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Related to FHA are Rural Housing Service (RHS) and Veterans Affairs single-family programs, 
which are smaller but provide a similar role. The USDA offers directly-financed 502 loans and 502 loan 
guarantees, similar to FHA.  In 1999, 54,000 total 502 loans were made, 73 percent of which were 
guaranteed loans. The Department of Veterans Affairs offers mortgage insurance to veterans, service 
personnel, and spouses.  Lenders are guaranteed for up to 50 percent of losses for loans less than $45,000 
or the lesser of $50,000 or 25 percent for larger loans.  In fiscal year 2000, VA guaranteed 176,000 loans. 
Approximately 800,000 to 1 million loans are backed by FHA insurance annually, and VA guarantees 
180,000 to 200,000.  FHA and VA combined served half a million white borrowers in 2000, 125,000 
African American borrowers and 150,000 Latino borrowers.  Interviews with minority borrowers indicate 
the FHA name implies the trust and confidence of the federal government, which is valued by consumers 
who have had difficult histories with the financial sector.  Table 5 shows that federal mortgage insurance 
programs are less likely to serve white borrowers for home purchase loans, and more likely to serve 
African Americans and Latinos, than conventional loans.  These programs are also much more prevalent 
among lower-income borrowers. 
Table 5 
2000 HMDA Market Share for Purchase Loans 
Share of Total by Race Conventional FHA/VA/RHS 
White 71.4% 57.7% 
Native American 0.5% 0.5% 
Asian Pacific 4.1% 1.6% 
African American 4.8% 13.0% 
Latino 6.0% 15.4% 
Other/Joint/Race N/A 13.2% 11.8% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
   
Share of Total by Income Conventional FHA/VA/RHS 
Less than 50% of MSA median 7.0% 11.0% 
50-79% of MSA median 17.6% 33.6% 
80-99% of MSA median 12.5% 20.6% 
100-119% of MSA median 11.7% 14.1% 
120% or more of MSA median 48.2% 19.5% 
Income not available 2.9% 1.3% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
Source: 2000 FFIEC National Aggregate Tables 4-1 & 4-2 
<http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda_rpt/natagg_result.htm> 
 
However, FHA and other government-backed loans grew only by 11 percent from 1993 to 2000, less 
than one-third of the 37 percent growth rate for mortgage lending overall.  Table 6 shows conventional 
lending is penetrating into lower-income and minority markets faster than government lending; marking 
movement into traditionally labeled underserved markets by the private sector (see Appendix Table E 
and G).  While FHA/VA is increasingly serving more non-white borrowers, the volume of white 
borrowers is actually declining.   FHA/VA lags the growth rates of conventional lending for every racial 
and income group. 
Table 6 
Percent Change in Volume for Home Purchase Loans 
% Change 1993  2000 FHA/VA/RHS Conventional All Lenders 
All Loans 11 % 45 % 37 % 
Low-Income Borrower* 43 113 87 
White Borrower -8 35 25 
African-American Borrower 56 122 89 
Latino Borrower 125 147 138 
Source: 2000 FFIEC National Aggregate Tables 4-1 & 4-2 
<http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda_rpt/natagg_result.htm>  * Defined as earning less than 
80 of area median income, per HUD guidelines. 
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FHAs single-family mutual mortgage insurance fund programs, sometimes called 203(b) after 
authorizing legislation, have returned to sounder actuarial footing after troubles in previous decades.  
FHA regularly returns funds to the Treasury from the collection of premiums.  In the 1990s, FHA reduced 
premiums and instituted administrative efficiencies to streamline processing and achieve higher levels of 
quality control.  Recently FHA delinquency rates have climbed, however.  Figure 3 shows a growing gulf 
between delinquency rates on conventional and FHA loans.  While FHA has not experienced a significant 
rise in claims, the cause of this differential in delinquency rates merits more analysis. 
Figure 3 
 
Private mortgage insurance (MI) covered 1.2 
million borrowers in 2000, 40 percent more than 
FHA.  Private MI covers a smaller portion of the 
loan balance, typically 25 to 35 percent of home 
values.  FHA insurance provides lenders a payment 
of a claim of up to 100 percent of the loan balance in 
the case of a foreclosure (Figure 4).  This difference 
is largely nominal since most claims to FHA are 35 
percent or less of the initial loan value.  In a deep 
recession, where housing prices drop and many 
borrowers default, FHAs deeper catastrophic 
coverage is more likely to be utilized, however. 
Increasingly FHA and private mortgage insurance markets overlap as more borrowers with marginal 
credit purchase or refinance homes with high loan-to-value ratios.  In the 1990s, private mortgage 
insurance became more aggressive in targeting lower-income borrowers.  Private mortgage insurance 
today will insure loans above 97 percent loan-to-value ratios, and uses underwriting ratios similar to 
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FHA.39  At a 90 percent loan-to-value, private MI typically charges approximately the same as FHA in 
monthly premium, but not FHAs 1.50 percent up-front premium, nor do borrowers face the 1/8th of a 
point interest rate premium FHA lenders usually charge.  Since FHAs premiums are fixed, FHA is a 
better deal for borrowers than private MI only at high loan-to-value ratios (Table 7). However, the result 
is that loans with lower loan-to-value ratios, and correspondingly of better credit quality, are siphoned 
from FHAs portfolio.  The resulting adverse selection may be making FHAs book of business riskier, 
explaining recent increases in relative delinquencies and foreclosures.40 
Table 7 
Mortgage Insurance Premiums: FHA vs. Private MI 
$100,000 House 
 FHA, 2001 RMIC With Annual 
Refund, 2001 
LTV Upfront 
Premium 
Monthly 
Premium  
Upfront 
Premium 
Monthly 
Premium  
97% $1,455  $485  $2,086  $485  
95% $1,425  $475  $1,853  $466  
90% $1,350  $450  $1,080  $306  
85% $1,275  $425  $425  $289  
* RMIC used as an example only.  Loss coverage on FHA is 100%. Loss 
coverage on RMIC is 35%. Assumes refund option. RMIC only available 
for FICO scores >620, or  >660 for above 97% LTV and > 640 above 95% 
LTV mortgages. FHA has no cutoff score. 
 
The effectiveness of FHAs mortgage insurance operations compared to its private-sector counterparts 
is questionable.  In the 1990s, FHA reduced its staff by one-quarter, consolidated single-family operations 
into four homeownership centers, and moved many functions to private contractors.  However, 
problems in overseeing contractors have arisen, shifts in workforce deployment have been uneven, and 
FHAs long-tenured workforce is faulted with lacking the skills needed in the mortgage industry today.  
The process of selling FHAs foreclosed homes is also criticized for being cumbersome and time-
consuming, resulting in vacant homes that depress neighborhood housing values.  Some FHA loan claims 
involve outstanding loans balances in excess of property values, due to inflated appraisals, neighborhood 
and property decline, or poor loan underwriting. 
The desire to stabilize FHAs operations has led to several reform proposals.  Ideas range from more 
outsourcing, to partnering with private mortgage insurers, to chartering FHA as an independent, 
government-owned corporation.  Some argue these reforms are needed to keep FHA from becoming a 
dinosaur that no longer effectively expands the reach of mortgage markets.  Changes in the mortgage 
market, and FHAs inability to overcome bureaucratic shackles, they would argue, require a significantly 
different direction for the agency.  Others argue FHA continues to serve an important niche market and 
that its declining market share relative to conventional lending simply shows the private market is 
effectively being leveraged.  
FHA, with the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, enjoys advantages the private market 
cannot match, however.  FHA has a low cost of capital and no need to return profits to investors.  And, 
the market continues to have segments of borrowers who need a credit enhancement.  Given the 
inequality of wealth, credit and income by race and neighborhood type, it could be argued FHA should 
provide its specialized low-cost credit enhancement regardless of gains by the private market.   
 
Policy Proposal:  FHA Risk-Sharing The blending of private and FHA-insured markets has led to 
proposals to involve FHA in partnerships with private mortgage insurers, mortgage-bond issuers and 
                                                          
39 Private MI will insure loans at higher than 97% LTV, but face higher capital requirements and therefore charge much higher 
premiums. As a result, most lending backed by private MI is below 97% LTV. 
40 See Susan W. Gates, FHA at a Crossroads, Freddie Mac Secondary Mortgage Markets (SMM), Vol. 11, No. 3, 1995. 
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financial institutions operating in the secondary markets.  Under such proposals, FHA typically retains the 
catastrophic loss position, but shares the top 20 to 30 percent of losses with a private-sector partner. Risk-
sharing potentially will allow FHA to use existing private-market channels to access customers not served 
by current FHA lenders.  FHA may also gain efficiencies by using risk-sharing partners to operate better 
underwriting and property disposition functions.  By entering into risk-sharing agreements, FHA might 
force private-sector partners to create more transparent systems for loan application and pricing, bringing 
standardization to emerging markets.  The details of a risk-sharing program will have to be carefully and 
incrementally developed, but in principal these arrangements might present a more vigorous future for 
FHA.41  Other models of risk-sharing might also be explored, such as pool-level reinsurance, or captive 
reinsurance structures, which share risk, and reward risk-management for specific lenders or products.  
FHA might also experiment with providing loan loss reserves for pools of loans instead of individual, 
playing more of a wholesale rather than retail role. 
Policy Proposal: FHA Disposition of Foreclosed Properties While FHA has increased its 
monitoring of lenders and streamlined disposition of foreclosed properties, including creating Asset 
Control Areas (ACA) that allow expedited sales of units at low cost to local governments and nonprofits, 
the impact of FHA-loan defaults remains contentious.  The use of management and marketing contractors 
has reduced the time properties remain vacant, but fears that disposition practices will destabilize 
neighborhoods remain.  One proposal is for FHA to take assignment of loans and sell them in bulk, direct 
from the mortgagee.  The purchaser of the loans would have an incentive to maximize repayment, shorten 
time properties are in default, and reduce claim costs.  FHA would need statutory authority to pay claims 
prior to foreclosure and have lenders assign the mortgages to purchasers.  Concerns have been raised 
about private specialists sensitivity to the neighborhood impact of properties during disposition, as well 
as FHAs capacity to manage such an arrangement, however. 
 
2.) Below-Market Interest Rates: Mortgage Revenue Bonds 
Single-family housing bonds, known as Mortgage Revenue Bonds (MRBs), are sold to investors in 
order to finance below-market interest rate mortgages for lower-income, first-time homebuyers.  Investors 
are willing to purchase these bonds at below-market interest rates because the income from MRBs is tax-
free.  MRBs have aided 2 million families since 1986 to access below-market rate mortgage loans.  In 
1999, $10.3 billion in loans were funded for more than 125,000 lower-income families.42  
A typical MRB mortgage saves as much as 100 to 200 basis points compared to a conventional 
mortgage, and offers lower downpayments and more flexible underwriting.  MRB loans are limited to 
first-time homebuyers who earn no more than the median income in their area.  If a borrowers income 
rises above eligible levels, up to half of any profit from the sale of the financed home may be recaptured 
for up to nine years.  By lowering the monthly carrying cost of mortgages with subsidized interest rates, 
MRBs help first-time buyers overcome income barriers to owning a home.  MRBs also can help buyers 
overcome a lack of downpayment and closing costs.  The average MRB-backed loan in 1999 had a loan-
to-value ratio of 95.5 percent.  However, when MRB-funded mortgages ease downpayment requirements, 
these loans require the payment of mortgage insurance, which raises the effective interest rate on the loan, 
reducing the impact of below-market rate funds.  However, as described in Section 2, most renters cannot 
afford a home because they lack both adequate income and savings.  As a result, nearly 60 percent of 
MRB loans are insured by FHA, providing a credit enhancement for low-downpayment loans without 
limiting affordability.   
State housing agencies issuing MRBs can also convert MRB issuing authority into mortgage credit 
certificates (MCCs). Rather than creating a subsidy that reaches buyers through reduced interest rates, 
                                                          
41 In 1995, the Administration proposed restructuring FHA and Ginnie Mae as a government-owned corporation within HUD. 
42 MRBs are limited by a private-activity, tax-exempt bond volume maximum of $75 per capita. Congress increased the private 
activity bond ceiling (which includes multifamily, commercial, education and other bonds) from $50 in 2000 (with a minimum 
of $225 million per state), and will be adjusted annually for inflation beginning in 2003. 
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MCCs provide tax credits directly to buyers of owner-occupied housing, reducing their annual tax 
liability.  MCCs provide first-time homebuyers with a nonrefundable income tax credit of 10 percent to 
50 percent of the borrowers annual mortgage interest payments (up to $2,000 annually).  An MCC worth 
25 percent of a house price creates an interest subsidy equal to an average MRB-funded mortgage loan. 
While allocated by state housing agencies, MCCs do not require access to debt or equity markets.  
Typically, buyers receive credits directly from state housing agencies after qualifying for a mortgage from 
a conventional lender.  As a result, the administrative costs of MCCs are low.  Only 12 states participated 
in the MCC program in 1999, issuing 5,200 certificates, however.  This low utilization rate is in part due 
to the fact that state agencies using MCCs forego an opportunity to earn revenue by issuing bonds.  Also, 
lenders often do not understand how to use the program. The primary factor limiting MCC usage, 
however, is its non-refundability. Since any amount of the credit exceeding the taxpayers total tax bill is 
foregone, many lower-income borrowers have little use for the MCC. 
By most accounts, MRBs and the administration of this program by state housing finance agencies is 
effective at expanding the reach of mortgage markets.  Use of the program varies by statesome states 
deeply target MRB issuance to lower-income families and minorities, while others use the program to 
serve families with more moderate incomes and smaller shares of minorities.  State by state variation in 
the quality and competency of housing agencies creates some inconsistencies in the program, but by 
devolving decisions to a state level, flexibility to serve housing markets is retained.  The major obstacles 
facing MRB policy are the low level of the maximum purchase price and the limitations imposed by the 
10-year rule. 
Policy Proposal:  Loan Limits Homes purchased with MRB-financed mortgages must cost less than 
90 percent of the average area home price, as determined by IRS-published safe harbor limitswhich 
were last updated in 1994.43 The utility of the MRB program is limited in higher cost areas because 
qualified buyers cannot find homes priced below these obsolete limits.  The limits are based on data from 
a survey conducted by the Federal Housing Finance Board and modified by HUDbut HUD no longer 
analyzes survey data for the IRS.  One solution is to re-calculate maximum home values as a multiple of 
eligible buyer income, similar to HUD median income guidelines, times a fixed multiple, based on 
standard underwriting ratios.  Setting the MRB purchase price limit at 3.5 times the eligible income limit 
would dramatically simplify this regulation.  According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, this will cost 
$439 million over ten years.  Some argue loan limits are simply an extension of income limits, and 
therefore duplicative. However, some buyers may not be income qualified, but have access to substantial 
sources of equity. Without a loan limit, these buyers could make very large downpayments on high-end 
homes financed by an MRB-backed loan.  Retaining a simplified rule will direct subsidy to more needy 
buyers and prevent a public relations fiasco. 
Policy Proposal:  Repeal of 10-year Rule Initially, allocating agencies could use all payments they 
received from MRB-financed mortgages to make new mortgages.  In 1988, however, the law was 
changed requiring principal payments received after ten years post-origination to be used to pay off 
bonds, instead of being rolled over into a new mortgage.  The maximum term of an MRB loan is already 
limited to the maximum term of the mortgages financed30 years. Even when funds are replaced by 
issuing refunding bonds, typically when market interest rates have declined and older bonds can be 
reissued at lower rates, all bonds must be redeemed within 32 years of origination regardless. Repealing 
the ten-year rule will allow more mortgages to be issued under the private activity bond cap.  The 
Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation has estimated that repeal will cost $2.4 billion over 10 years, 
if MRB-funded debt was treated the same as other tax-exempt private activity bonds.  The NCSHA 
                                                          
43 States have the option to determine their own limits, but typically rely on the IRS limits due to the difficulty of collecting and 
analyzing sales price data at a state level. 
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estimates approximately $2.1 billion in mortgage volume will be lost in 2001 due to the ten-year rule, 
constraining 27,000 first-time homebuyers from MRB-financed homeownership.44 
 
3.) Regulation: Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) and GSE Goals 
Community Reinvestment Act: CRA has endured a high level of scrutiny recently.  The Federal 
Reserve, at the direction of Congress, recently issued an evaluation of the impact of the law, as did the 
Treasury department, in addition to private research conducted in academia and by foundations.  The 
intention of CRA more than 25 years ago was to obligate financial institutions benefiting from federal 
deposit insurance, or under regulation as part of the bank regulatory system, to make credit available in 
neighborhoods and to populations considered to be underserved.   
Banks get credit for loans made in neighborhoods with incomes of less than 80 percent of area median, 
as well as to borrowers with similar income levels.   Lenders are required to disclose information on the 
race and income of mortgage loan applicants, as well as property location, in order to test for disparate 
treatment among neighborhoods or racial and income groups.  Financial institutions regularly undergo 
CRA exams, receiving ratings of how well the goals of CRA were met.  Community groups report that 
CRA has been a very powerful tool to encourage lenders to become more active in underserved areas.  
Lenders receive credit for making loans, investments, grants and other activities that stimulate community 
reinvestment.  Recent studies find CRA has been uneven in its enforcement and effectiveness, but overall 
is a very important incentive for lenders to engage borrowers who otherwise might not be served. 
Analysis suggests that CRA has helped to expand access to home mortgage credit for low-income and 
minority borrowers and neighborhoods.45 
CRA requires bank regulators to assess institutions for meeting a lending test, investment test, and 
service test.  Large banks face the highest level of scrutiny; smaller institutions and limited purpose banks 
require lower levels of analysis.  In recent years, the market assessment areas under which a lender must 
be accountable under CRA have become muddied as institutions merged and nationalized, simultaneous 
to the advent of telephonic and internet lending.  Some lenders are not covered under CRA, while others 
are, but only in specific markets.  Rural areas, generally, are not well patrolled by CRA regulations. 
GSE Goals:  HUD is responsible for oversight of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac through OFHEO 
(Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight).  It has set aggressive goals for secondary market 
purchases of affordable housing loans and loans to traditionally underserved areas.  The Special 
Affordable Housing Goal, loans made to low-income families in low-income areas, was recently raised 
from 14 to 20 percent of all lending. The Geographical Targeted Goal requires 31 percent of all loans to 
be originated on properties located in central cities, rural areas or underserved areas.  Purchases of loans 
several years post-origination, also called seasoned mortgages, which have passed the period when 
defaults are most likely, also are counted if the originating lender is issuing new affordable mortgages 
with the funds.  These goals, including oversight and monitoring by HUD, have helped encourage Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac to expand the reach of the mortgage market to thousands of families. 
Policy Proposal:  Affirm CRA and GSE Goals These two federal regulatory policies play a very 
important role in expanding the reach of the mortgage markets.  In recent years, these regulations, 
especially CRA, have been frequently attacked.  While regulation has its costs, it also ultimately ensures 
financial institutions benefiting from implicit or explicit federal guarantees do serve the public interest. 
 
                                                          
44 National Conference of State Housing Agencies (NCSHA). 
45 See: Eric S. Belsky, Gary R. Fauth, Michael Schill, Anthony Yezer, The Impact of the Community Reinvestment Act on Bank 
and Thrift Home Purchase Mortgage Lending, Working paper from Changing Financial Markets and Community 
Development, Federal Reserve System's Second Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C. April 5-6, 2001. 
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4.) Government Sponsored Enterprises: Support of the GSEs 
The U.S. relies heavily on Ginnie Mae, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and the Federal Home Loan Bank 
system to finance housing. These secondary market entities guarantee half or more of all mortgage debt 
issued.  The market power of these enterprises, and the return that taxpayers receive, are often questioned, 
however. 
Ginnie Mae:  FHA-backed loans are sold in the secondary market through Ginnie Mae, a government 
owned and operated enterprise (in contrast to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which are shareholder 
owned).  Ginnie Mae guarantees FHA-backed loans issued by lenders as mortgage-backed securities 
purchased by investors.  By selling loans, lenders receive liquidity that allows them to issue more loans.  
Ginnie Mae charges a 6 basis point annual guarantee fee to the originating lender, but also allows loan 
servicers to charge a 44 basis point servicing fee.46  By contrast, conventional loans sold through Fannie 
Mae or Freddie Mac often incur a 20 to 30 basis point guarantee fee and rarely offer more than 30 basis 
points in servicing fees.  However, unlike Ginnie Mae, originating lenders working with Fannie Mae or 
Freddie Mac do not have to hold any reserve against loans sold or swapped to the secondary market.  
Lenders may be forced to replace loans that do not conform to contractual agreements, but generally are 
able to free up capital for further lending.  This accounts for some of the differential in guarantee fees.  
Ginnie Mae allows larger servicing fees due to the higher costs of servicing government-backed loans. 
Federal Home Loan Banks:  The Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) system of 12 regional banks is 
regulated by the Federal Housing Finance Board, in its effort to insure member institutions have sufficient 
liquidity.  Advances by the FHLBs are crucial to mortgage lending by its members, avoiding regional 
credit crunches and freeing up capital flows.  Each regional bank is required to provide Affordable 
Housing Program (AHP) grants and loans for targeted buyers and communities.  The AHP is dedicated as 
10 percent of bank proceeds, in lieu of payment of certain taxes.   
In addition to the benefits of increasing liquidity and the AHP, the FHLB of Chicago recently began 
the Mortgage Partnership Finance (MPF) initiative in 1997.  Similar to the Mortgage Partnership Program 
developed by other banks, these programs allow depository members of the FHLB system to pass loans to 
the secondary market, instead of holding them in portfolio.  While Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac offer a 
similar outlet, the FHLB program does not levy an annual guarantee fee.  Instead, the program pays the 
originating lender a credit enhancement fee in exchange for the lender taking on the first loss position 
(after borrowers equity and mortgage insurance).  The FHLB takes on macroeconomic interest rate risks 
with its access to capital markets, diversifies away prepayment risks, and provides liquidity back to 
lenders.  The local lender retains credit and servicing risks, which are the risks lenders are in the best 
position to manage.  This risk-sharing arrangement ideally keeps lenders accountable, but increases the 
overall efficiency.  Lenders have reduced capital requirements using MPP, compared to other secondary 
market outlets, since capital requirements are based on the mortgages credit enhancement rather than the 
full loan balance.47 There are now several variations on these models (called MPF Classic, MPF 100, 
MPF 125, MPF 125+, etc. depending on the risk-sharing arrangement involved) and the volume of loans 
using these programs is predicted to increase.  Smaller lenders, too small to meet the requirements of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are attracted by the potential to recycle their conventional loans at a lower 
cost than in the private-placement mortgage-backed security market.  While still a growing effort, this is 
an example of the innovative strategies possible in mortgage finance.  
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac:  With special products and aggressive marketing, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac help traditionally underserved families to access home mortgage loans. Congressionally 
chartered and privately owned, the mission of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac is to provide liquidity and 
stability to the housing finance system while promoting access to mortgage credit throughout the nation.   
                                                          
46 In an effort to raise revenues, Congress directed Ginnie Mae to raise the guarantee fee to 9 basis points in 2002.  Even at 6 
basis points, Ginnie Mae provides a source of positive subsidy to the federal treasury. 
47 The low-recourse rule under FIRREA applies. See also: < www.fhlbc.com/mpf.htm.> 
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Homebuyers pay lower interest rates if their mortgages do not exceed the $275,000 jumbo limit for 
loans eligible for purchase by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac.48  The cost of mortgage credit is lower for all 
borrowers purchasing homes with mortgages below this threshold amount.  In 1998, when the financial 
markets faced a liquidity crisis in the wake of a global economic slowdown, U.S. mortgage borrowers did 
not experience an interruption in credit, in part due to the role of these GSEs.  These enterprises also have 
invested in costly automated underwriting systems, now adopted as industry standards, and have helped 
reduce overall transaction costs in the market.  These GSEs develop innovative loan products, as well as 
support national marketing and outreach efforts.  One example is the step-down mortgage, targeted to 
subprime borrowers.  These loans have higher interest rates for the first 24 months, but rates decline to 
conventional, prime rates if the borrower makes regular, timely payments.  Freddie Macs innovative 
Dont Borrow Trouble initiative, and Fannie Maes partnership with the Self-Help Credit Union to 
purchase affordable loans are further examples of new approaches supported by these entities. 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are considered to have an implicit guarantee from the federal 
government, allowing them to borrow at rates just above Treasury bills and below what their corporate 
credit ratings would otherwise dictate.  These enterprises are also exempt from certain fees, regulations 
and taxes other corporations would be required to pay.  The Congressional Budget Office has conducted 
controversial research showing consumers do not benefit from Fannie Mae and Freddie Macs special 
treatment as much as previously believed.  Some primary market lenders and private mortgage insurance 
companies claim Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac use duopolistic market power to their own advantage 
against the rest of the industry.  Advocates for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac argue these entities market 
power is appropriate since economies of scale are required to efficiently manage and channel risks in the 
mortgage market.  Since weakening Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac could increase the costs of credit, other 
observers have suggested Ginnie Mae, the FHLBs and other GSEs ought to be encouraged to expand their 
role, fostering greater competition among existing secondary markets. 
Policy Proposal:  Affirm GSEs as Sources of Standardization and Innovation Government 
supported secondary markets can use their clout to establish best practices, restrictions and pricing 
standards.  For example, in 2001 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac will secure over $7 billion in subprime 
loans, promising these loans do not contain provisions harmful to consumers.49  Their role should add 
transparency to the market, reducing opportunities for unscrupulous lenders to take advantage of 
consumers. Other niche lending markets, such as home improvement lending, acquisition and 
development finance, or manufactured housing lending, present similar opportunities to expand the reach 
of mortgage markets though GSE innovations.  While no specific federal policies are required, policy 
makers ought to expect the FHLBs and Ginnie Mae, in addition to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, to serve 
as leaders and stewards of the mortgage markets.  Proposals to weaken these entities are unlikely to 
benefit consumers, but the regulatory role of HUD and the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise 
Oversight, discussed above, as well as the Federal Home Loan Bank Board remain important to ensure 
that public policy goals are being advanced by the GSEs. 
5.) Expanding the Reach of Mortgage Finance Through Tax Policies  
Federal income tax policies support homeownership through the mortgage interest deduction, the real 
estate tax deduction, the exclusion of house price appreciation from capital gains taxes, and penalty-free 
IRA withdrawals for first-time buyers.  The largest tax expenditures for homeownership are the mortgage 
interest deduction and the real estate tax deduction.  Valued together at $58 billion, these two deductions 
amount to twice the amount allocated to all direct federal housing assistance programs in the U.S.50 Most 
low-income households do not use these deductions, however.  Due to smaller loan sizes and lower 
property values, most lower-income familys itemized deductions do not exceed the value of their 
                                                          
48 Congress raised the limit for conforming loans to $325,000 for 2002. 
49 Inside B&C Lending, October 15, 2001. 
50 Some economists argue that the largest tax benefit of homeownership is the fact that imputed rent (in effect, the rent that 
buyers who own their home free and clear do not have to pay) is not taxed. Value estimate from Joint Committee on Taxation. 
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standard deduction.  Since the standard deduction is a fixed amount for all taxpayers in each filing status, 
only as incomes and itemized deductions rise does it make sense to bypass standard deduction and tax 
advantage of the mortgage interest and real estate deductions.  As a result of the progressive nature of 
federal income tax rates, even if lower-income owners do itemize their deductions, they receive a smaller 
deduction as a percentage of income than more affluent buyers.51  Not surprising, an estimated 90 percent 
of the total benefits of the mortgage interest deduction accrue to homebuyers with more than $40,000 in 
income.52 
Excluding capital gains from owning a home may help reduce the need for sellers to inflate their 
asking prices to compensate for taxes, but offers little direct benefit to first-time buyers.  The exclusion of 
early-withdrawal penalties on up to $10,000 of tax-advantaged savings stored in an Individual Retirement 
Account (IRA) for a home purchase provides a potential source of downpayment.  However, only 17 
percent of low-income renters under 35 have retirement accounts.53 It is also unlikely for low-income 
families to have parents or grandparents with a well-funded IRA account.54 Overall, current tax law does 
little to expand the reach of mortgage markets to low-income households.  In fact, some researchers have 
shown the mortgage interest and real estate tax deduction are actually included in the price of homes
that is sellers, buyers and loan underwriters assume the use of these deductions in determining 
affordability.55  Thus, the cost of homes is inflated, but since households with low tax liabilities cannot 
take advantage of these deductions, they are penalized. 
Policy Proposal Overview:  Tax Credits for Homeownership  In rental housing, the Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) has led to the development of more than one million units for low-income 
renters since 1987.  Allocated by state housing finance agencies annually through a competitive process, 
credits enhance the returns of project development, reducing the amount of debt needed to produce 
apartments affordable to low-income families.  The success of the LIHTC has resulted in proposals for a 
similar credit for homeownership.  In the last decade a number of proposals have been created, several of 
which have been proposed as legislation. 
Tax credits to subsidize the cost of homeownership can either be provided directly to homebuyers or 
they can be provided to lenders and investors who pass through the benefits of the credit to homebuyers.   
Credits provided directly to homebuyers are theoretically more efficient since a financial intermediary 
will not absorb part of the subsidy.  However, it is difficult to design an individually-based tax credit that 
is not available to all taxpayers who qualify under the terms of the tax credit.  Such open-ended tax credits 
tend to be considerably more expensive from a government revenue standpoint, and expenditures tend to 
be difficult to predict and control.  More importantly, a tax credit is of no value to an individual with little 
or no income taxes due, unless the credit is refundable (meaning tax payers could receive a check from 
the Internal Revenue Service in the amount of the any unapplied credit).  However, refundable tax credits 
are generally dismissed by policymakers due to fraudulent activity experienced under previous tax credit 
policies.  As a result, most tax credit proposals are designed to provide a fixed value annually, and are 
                                                          
51 Wealthier buyers tend to buy more expensive homes, which result in higher interest payments and, therefore, larger tax 
deductions.  Moreover, the rate structure increases as incomes rise, so reducing a $1 of taxable income in a 33% marginal tax 
bracket ($0.33) is more valuable than a $1 off of income in a 15% marginal bracket ($0.15). 
52 Richard Green and Andrew Reschovsky, The Design of a Mortgage Interest Tax Credit: Final Report Submitted to the 
National Housing Institute, September 1997.  See also: Green, Richard K. and Kerry D. Vandell, Giving Households Credit:  
How Changes in the Tax Code Could Promote Homeownership. Center for Urban Land Economics Research, University of 
Wisconsin-Madison School of Business, Working paper, January 8, 1998. 
53 Federal Reserve Survey of Consumer Finances, 1995, tabulation by Joint Center for Housing Studies. 
54 1997 tax law allows withdrawals up to $10,000 each by eligible buyers, their parents and grandparents towards first-home 
purchase. 2000 tax laws also allow a non-refundable tax credit matching up to 50 percent of IRA savings by low-income 
taxpayers, which could also be tapped penalty-free. 
55 James R. Follain and Lisa Strurman, The False Messiah of Tax Policy:  What Elimination of the Home Mortgage Interest 
Deduction Promises and a Careful Look at What it Delivers, Working paper, Syracuse University, April 17, 1998. 
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provided to corporations and investors with sufficient tax liabilities to use a credit.  The LIHTC is 
allocated per capita and administered by state or federal agencies, primarily to corporate investors.   
Policy Proposal:  Second Mortgage Tax Credit for Homeownership  One proposal is to create a 
lender-based tax credit used to subsidize second mortgage loans to cover closing costs and downpayments 
(second liens are second in line to collect in the case of default).  As long as loan-to-value ratios are low, 
the first mortgage lender is protected from losses even if real estate values decline, much as they would 
using mortgage insurance.  Allocating agencies could auction off per capita amounts of tax credits to 
lenders agreeing to originate 30-year, low-interest-rate second mortgages.  If affordable homes sell for 
$100,000, each second mortgage might be for 22 percent of the homes appraised value, or $22,000, to 
cover a 20 percent downpayment and two-percent closing costs, leaving an 80 percent loan-to-value first 
mortgage.56  The tax credit reduces the lenders annual tax bill by an amount over ten years that offsets a 
below-market interest rate on the second mortgage. By reducing the amount of the first mortgage to 
below 80 percent of appraised value, borrowers do not need to pay for mortgage insurance, thus reducing 
monthly payments on the first mortgage. This proposal helps first-time homebuyers overcome income 
barriers while also addressing a lack of savings for homeownership. 
However, second mortgages have drawbacks. Such a loan would require lenders to develop new 
underwriting and portfolio modeling capacity, as well as create new documentation.  There is also no 
consistent secondary market on a national scale for second mortgages.  The market rate of return for such 
loans is difficult to ascertain given the paucity of these loans currently. Since the credit makes up the 
difference between affordable and market rates, valuing the credit may initially be difficult.  Using two 
mortgages also adds transaction costs, each requiring disclosures, processing and loan servicing.  Since 
downpayment and closing cost loans in a second position are riskier than other loans, additional oversight 
and capital requirements would be required of lenders. While other federal programs, as well as market-
driven products, have certainly proven administrative mechanisms can be developed, this implies some 
time for the program to evolve.  Beyond problems faced by lenders, some borrowers may struggle to 
manage two separate mortgage payments.  Unlike mortgage insurance, the second mortgage cannot be 
canceled after combined loan-to-value ratios are reduced to conforming levels, nor will a premium refund 
be available (both loans could be refinanced into one conventional loan after more principal is paid down, 
but the costs of refinancing may be prohibitive for come borrowers).  
Second lien loans for downpayments and closing costs have been used, albeit somewhat cyclically, in 
the past, however, so some market experience is in place.  Moreover, the home equity lending market has 
substantial experience with second lien markets, and private placement secondary markets for 
downpayment and closing cost loans currently exist on a small scale.  A credit enhancement at the 
individual loan or loan pool level, likely from FHA or private mortgage insurance, could help standardize 
this market into mainstream financial channels.  It is likely many bidding lender pools would include 
nonprofit lenders or CDFIs, many with substantial experience making and servicing downpayment and 
closing costs loans.  From 1998 to 2000, for example, nonprofits in the NeighborWorks® network issued 
more than $46 million of these loans, leveraging nearly $1.3 billion in private lender first mortgages. 
Reaction by lenders and housing agencies to this proposal has been mixed.  Mortgage insurers have most 
resisted the concept because it will likely displace existing insurance products. 
Policy Proposal:  First Mortgage Tax Credit for Homeownership  Another approach for a lender-
based tax credit is to use credit proceeds in the form of prepaid points to buy-down the interest rate on a 
first mortgage.  For example, a $100,000 house might have 20 points of interest rate write-down, bringing 
an 8 percent interest rate down to 4 percent by paying off $20,000 of interest up front (assuming the loan 
is pre-paid in 10 years).57  Lenders would receive a one-time tax credit, in addition to below-market rates 
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Urban Studies of the Brookings Institution, 1999. 
57 Joe Birbaum and Geoffrey Cooper, Revisiting Tax Policy, Mortgage Banking Vol. 61, No. 2 November 2000. 
04/11/02 Homeownership and the Role of Federal Housing Policy 28 
of interest and return of principal.  Lenders would have to factor prepayment and default probabilities into 
their bid for a credit, and could also sell their credits to other parties.  By lowering interest costs, this 
credit provides a subsidy similar to the Mortgage Revenue Bond program, without issuing long-term tax-
exempt debt, but potentially providing much deeper interest rate subsidies. 
This proposal reduces interest costs on a single home mortgage, but might not reduce downpayment 
and closing costs.  Without a high loan-to-value ratio, buyers will need to make larger downpayments, 
creating wealth barriers to homeownership.  The first mortgage amount will likely need to be raised above 
appraised value to finance closing costs, creating a total loan-to-value ratio of 102 percent or more.  Like 
higher LTV MRB-backed mortgages, these loans will likely rely on FHA or other mortgage insurance.  
Also like MRBs, however, due to below-market rates, the impact of mortgage insurance premiums on 
affordability will be reduced.  This proposal would use existing mortgage application and servicing 
systems, unlike a second mortgage tax credit.  The one-year term of this credit also provides for efficient 
administration and oversight.  Like the second mortgage tax credit, this proposal is another innovative 
example of how the tax code can be improved to promote low-income homeownership.58 
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SECTION 4: EDUCATING AND PROTECTING CONSUMERS ENGAGED IN MORTGAGE AND HOME EQUITY 
MARKETS 
 
A.) Balancing Risks of Homeownership Policies with Consumer Welfare  
Buying and owning a home is a riskier proposition for families than renting.  Buyers take on enormous 
debts, sign 30-year mortgage contracts, and become responsible for the maintenance costs of their home. 
Because foreclosure can devastate a familys economic and social standing, as well as destabilize 
neighborhoods, making sure families have sufficient personal financial management skills is more than an 
ancillary issue.  Consumers infrequently apply for loans and typically do not understand the complexity 
of the mortgage transaction.  Lenders and real estate professionals, in contrast, engage in these 
transactions frequently.  This presents an information asymmetry between parties in the transaction.  Loan 
applicants, especially first-time buyers, rely on information provided by others.  Due to the wide variety 
of loan products and pricing structures, comparisons of loan terms, fees and requirements are difficult.  
Consumers often cannot evaluate if the loan they have been offered is a good deal.  Even after closing 
on a home, new homeowners often need help in understanding any recourse they might have, as well as 
how and when to refinance their mortgage or sell their home.  As homeownership is expanded to more 
low- and very-low-income people, public policy must ensure that buyers understand their rights and 
responsibilities.  Financial education provided by community organizations in partnership with financial 
institutions can help families enter the mainstream financial sector, successfully find the best deal and a 
fair loan, as well as increase their capacity to handle financial emergencies.59 
 
B.) Fair Lending  
Federal law requires all would-be homebuyers to be treated equally by real estate agents, lenders, 
appraisers, and insurance brokers.  Fair lending referrals to the Department of Justice and enforcement of 
these laws, however, are uneven.  Recent research suggests minorities may still face discrimination due to 
differential treatment individually or suffer from disparate impact collectively.  
Minority mortgage applicants continue to be rejected at much higher rates than white applicants.  
According to 2000 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, conventional home purchase loan 
denial rates were 22 percent for white applicants, 31 percent for Latino applicants and 45 percent for 
African-American applicants.  Studies show the income and employment history of applicants, the type of 
property involved, as well as credit quality can explain some of this differential, but some remains.  
Evidence is not definitive due to a lack of a national controlled study, but it still suggests that minorities 
face significant hurdles.60   
The potential for discrimination exists at several points in the homebuying process, from the home 
search, to the loan application and approval process, to the type of loan terms actually provided.  
Differential treatment discrimination might be found not only when a minority applicant is rejected and a 
similar non-minority applicant is approved, but also when a minority borrower receives less favorable 
loan terms, fees or pricing than a comparable non-minority applicant.  Similarly, disparate impact 
discrimination is found when an otherwise color-blind lending policy in practice disadvantages a larger 
share of minorities than non-minorities, controlling for other factors.  
Policy Proposal: Continue Fair Lending Efforts, Examinations and Enforcement Outreach and 
advertising can dramatically impact minority borrowers perceptions of lenders.  Conventional lenders 
should increase outreach efforts in minority areas and with community-based partners to attract minority 
                                                          
59 Sherrie L.W. Rhine, Maude Toussaint-Comeau, Jeanne M. Hogarth, and William H. Greene, The Role of Alternative 
Financial Service Providers in Serving LMI Neighborhoods, Working paper from Changing Financial Markets and 
Community Development, Federal Reserve System's Second Community Affairs Research Conference, Washington, D.C. 
April 5-6, 2001. 
60 Margery Austin Turner and Felicity Skidmore, Mortgage Lending Discrimination: A Review of Existing Evidence, September 
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applicants, and offer competitive loan products.  Regulatory agencies should continue to provide 
incentives for such outreach efforts, as well as CRA credit for participation in subsidy or guarantee 
programs for minority borrowers or in targeted neighborhoods.  Regulators should also enhance 
quantitative examination analysis with loan records as part of fair lending reviews.  Regulators also 
should increase their scrutiny of the terms and conditions offered by lenders to test for discriminatory 
pricing.  Analyzing the use of credit scores, loan pricing and terms (including points, fees, financing of 
lump sum insurance premium payments, balloon payments, and prepayment penalties) will help diagnose 
actions on behalf of institutions, subsidiaries or individual underwriters.  Finally, automated underwriting 
systems should be closely monitored over time for any evidence of unequal treatment. 
 
C.) Consumer Disclosure 
The Truth In Lending Act (TILA), Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), and Real 
Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) are intended to ensure that consumers obtain standardized 
information and clear direction during mortgage-financed home purchase transactions.  TILA is 
administered by the Federal Reserve under Regulation Z and requires consumers to receive standard 
documents to make comparisons between the cost of one loan to other loans, including finance charges 
and the annual percentage rate (which includes the amortization of closing costs).  TILA also provides 
consumers a three-day right of rescission for mortgage loans, and requires truthful advertising of loan 
terms, costs and fees.   
HOEPA was created in 1994 in response to reports of fraudulent lending, amending TILA for high-
cost mortgages, defined as those first mortgages with rates 8 percentage points above comparable 
Treasury securities, or loans with fees and points exceeding 8 percent of the loan amount.61  HOEPA 
requires a disclosure form to accompany high-cost loans explaining to borrowers that they are about to 
enter a contract with high costs, and that they need not complete the transaction.  The disclosure also 
highlights to the borrower their home could be taken if they fail to comply with these loan terms.  
HOEPA loans are prohibited from containing certain prepayment penalties, increased interest rates in 
default, balloon payments in the first five years, and negative amortization.  Recently approved new 
HOEPA rules also prohibit loan flippinga lender cannot refinance another HOEPA loan to the same 
borrower in a 12-month period without proving refinancing is in the borrowers best interest.  Lenders also 
must document borrowers ability to repay the loan and disclose if optional insurance and other fees are 
included in the loan or payments.  
RESPA is administered by HUDs Regulation X and requires pre-closing disclosure of costs related to 
a potential mortgage transaction.  Using a good faith estimate, as well as a settlement statement (form 
HUD-1 or HUD-1A), all parties to the transaction receiving a fee are disclosed.  RESPA also prohibits 
kickbacks, referrals and fees among brokers, lenders, appraisers, title companies, insurers and agents.  In 
2000, HUD fielded more than 900 RESPA-related complaints, approximately one-third involving 
kickbacks and other questionable payments.  In October 2001, HUD clarified REPSA requires disclosure 
of the specific services to be performed by the broker, a statement of whether the broker is acting as an 
agent for the borrower, and the amount of total compensation, including any yield-spread premium.62  
HUD also restated its policy that excessive and unreasonable fees are illegal under RESPA because they 
are not a payment for a bona fide service.  Finally, HUD is dedicating additional resources and personnel 
to support RESPA enforcement, as well as enhanced RESPA enforcement coordination between HUD 
                                                          
61 In December 2001, the Federal Reserve Board issued new HOEPA rules to lower the interest rate threshold to 8 from 10 
percent for first lien loans; the threshold for subordinate lien loans remains 10 percent.  The fee-based trigger was expanded to 
include optional insurance and other debt protection options, but remains at 8 percent of the loan amount.   
62 Yield spread premiums (YSPs) allow borrowers to substitute lump-sum fees at the time of settlement, but pay higher monthly 
payments over the life of the mortgage.  There have been repeated calls to ban YSPs, but HUD's policy continues to rule YSPs 
are legal if the broker actually performs services for the homebuyer, and the compensation received is related to the value of 
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and the major federal banking regulators (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Comptroller of the 
Currency, National Credit Union Administration, Office of Thrift Supervision and the Federal Reserve).63  
Related to these retail level policies are wholesale level disclosures.  The Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) provides the industry and regulators with data to monitor financial institutions 
lending practices.  Lending institutions submit their loan application records, which are compiled and 
distributed by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC).  Until recently, 
institutions were exempt if their assets are less than $31 million (for FY 2001), if mortgage loans are less 
than 10 percent of their lending, or if fewer than five loans are made in a metropolitan area.  Institutions 
report the race, gender and income of loan applicants as well as the property location (Census tract), the 
type and amount of the loan, and whether the lender approved, rejected, denied or originated the loan 
application. 
In January, 2002 the Federal Reserve issued changes to Regulation C extending HMDA coverage to 
non-depository institutions making more than $25 million in mortgage loans and removing the exemption 
for lenders not making more than ten percent of their total loans as mortgages.  The new rule requires 
lenders to identify whether the loan is high cost as defined by HOEPA, and to report the spread between 
the annual percentage rate and the yield on a comparable Treasury security when this spread exceeds 3 
percent for first-lien loans (5 percentage points for subordinate-lien loans).  The new regulation also 
requires lenders to report whether the loan involves a manufactured home. 
Lenders could be required to report applications in rural (non-metropolitan) areas.  Also, loan 
applications taken over the phone and Internet could be required to report race, income, and gender of the 
applicant.  Also, the FFIEC should work to make HMDA data more accessible to consumers and 
advocates. By expanding the number of institutions required to report under HMDA, and adding richer 
detail, greater understanding and analysis of the market will be possible.  While opponents argue HMDA 
regulations are burdensome for smaller lenders, or lenders with a small volume of mortgage lending, 
todays computerized database and electronic reporting technology have largely reduced the costs of 
disclosure. 
 
Policy Proposals: RESPA/TILA/HOEPA Modifications Proposals have been suggested to amend 
RESPA and TILA to make information more accessible to consumers.64 For creditors and settlement-
service providers, the TILA and RESPA rules can be complicated and may pose liability risks, however, 
and efforts to simplify or reform these regulations have been hotly contested.65 Existing RESPA and 
TILA regulations protect buyers to an extent, particularly by disclosing loan terms and conditions, and 
highlighting high-cost loans under HOEPA.  At a minimum, these documents should be improved by 
enhancing definitions and increasing clarity, including offering multi-lingual forms.  Given changes in the 
market, and the need to better protect consumers, a renewed effort to revise disclosure laws may be 
warranted. 
RESPA and TILA could be improved so that information on these disclosures is simpler, more reliable 
and provided earlier in the transaction.  For example, RESPA could be amended to allow lenders to 
bundle all fees for a transaction into one fixed price.  Borrowers could then shop around for the best rate 
of low interest rates and fees. Another proposal related to TILA is requiring lenders to disclose to 
borrowers all of the products a lender and its subsidiaries offer.  Recently, consumer advocates have 
voiced concerns that marginal mortgage loan applicants are regularly referred down to high-cost 
subprime subsidiaries, but rarely are consumers referred up to prime products.  Requiring all lenders to 
post rate sheets for all available loan products might be one way to help consumers recognize their menu 
                                                          
63 24 CFR Part 3500 Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 202, October 18, 2001. 
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interpretations. 
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of options.  Likewise, some subprime lenders are accused of not reporting current loans to credit bureaus, 
out of fear good-paying borrowers will attract prime-priced lenders looking to refinance higher-priced 
loans profitable to the originating lender.  Most lenders have disavowed this practice, but legislative 
action may be required to end it completely. 
One option under RESPA is to begin systematic collection of HUD-1 and HUD-1A settlement 
statements (HUD-1 forms involve buyers and sellers, HUD-1As cover single party transactions
typically for a new home).  Like other data, HUD could establish a central depository for these data, 
allowing participants in the market to establish benchmark costs and fees.  Such data also would create 
opportunities for HUD and other researchers to analyze anomalies and trends that could diagnose 
predatory practices.  This existing data source has the potential to dramatically increase the transparency, 
and therefore efficiency, of home sales transactions 
 
D.) Consumer Education and Counseling 
Homebuyer education programs were begun in the 1960s and 1970s, in response to rising foreclosures, 
particularly among FHA borrowers.66  Provided by local governments, nonprofit organizations, housing 
agencies, lenders, mortgage insurers and real estate agents, the industry is still nascent.  Recently, viewed 
in the context of raising overall financial literacyfrom public school curriculum on personal finance, to 
group classes provided by faith-based organizations, to public awareness campaigns on using consumer 
credit, there has been increasing interest in homebuyer education as a method to prepare families to take 
on the responsibilities of a mortgage and a home. 
Homebuyer education ranges from workbooks handed out by real estate agents, to advice and 
information given out on the telephone, to formalized group classes, informal homebuyer clubs and even 
intensive one-on-one counseling.  Each potential buyer has unique needs, but few standards exist 
concerning how to provide homebuyer education and counseling (in general, counseling refers to one-on-
one or small-group services, and education to self-guided or classroom instruction).  Services usually 
occur before the purchase, or ideally even before a family begins to search for a home, but often after a 
purchase contract is signed.  Counseling may also be provided post-purchase, however, to help families 
maintain their home, refinance, take out home improvement or reverse mortgages, or to manage 
delinquencies. 
Recent groundbreaking research by Freddie Mac demonstrates that pre-purchase homebuyer 
counseling and education has a measurable, positive impact on loan performance.  Face-to-face 
counseling, as opposed to that provided by a workbook or telephone, reduces defaults by up to 34 percent, 
controlling for other factors.67 
Expanding homebuyer education is problematic, however.  Many buyers do not want to take time to sit 
in classes or prepare workbooks before looking for a home and mortgage.  Taking part in education and 
counseling can slow down the buying process, potentially jeopardizing a purchase offer.  Real estate 
agents, sellers and lenders may discourage education or counseling for this reason.  Provision of 
homebuyer education and counseling is also expensivetypically $100 to $300 depending on the length, 
intensity and content.  Many borrowers, especially first-time borrowers, lack cash resources to pay such a 
fee.  Moreover, finding a qualified provider of homebuyer education and counseling can be difficult.   
The capacity of the nonprofit homebuyer education and counseling delivery system is not large enough 
to serve even a fraction of the approximately one million lower-income, first-time homebuyers generated 
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nationally each year.  Best estimates are that 120,000 to 150,000 individuals receive pre-purchase 
education though HUD-related programsa small fraction of homebuyers annually.   
Potential buyers need a trusted, third-party to help them assess their options and select the best home 
and loan product for their situation.  Nonprofits, while not immune, are less likely to be driven by 
demands of market forces into pushing biased information in an attempt to sell a product.  It is apparent 
lenders and borrowers, who benefit most directly from counseling, might be better targeted as sources of 
funding for counseling than the federal government.  Lenders, however, counter that the market is too 
competitive to allow for such costs, and many buyers simply cannot afford to pay.  Stylized estimates 
modeled in Table 8 show lender and buyer expected gains from counseling.  Borrowers who default often 
lose their home, have ruined credit for years, and suffer from emotional stress.  Neighborhoods with 
defaulted homes endure vacant units, with incumbent issues of neglect, as well as volatile values as 
foreclosed units are sold.  There is a general public good generated by helping borrowers avoid default. 
HUD support for housing counseling, provided under Section 106 of the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968, has increased to almost $25 million annually, but is spread among more than 
750 approved agencies, one-third direct to 328 HUD-approved providers, one-third to a dozen national 
intermediary organizations and one-third to 22 state housing finance agencies.68  The average grant per 
organization is $17,000.  These funds do not cover even a majority of counseling costs, yet also prohibit 
counseling providers from charging additional fees to lenders or borrowers.  Some nonprofits using these 
grants suggest that HUDs administration and restrictions are too cumbersome to warrant applying for 
funds.   
 
Table 8 
Estimation of Value of Home Buyer Counseling 
No Counseling Counseling Difference 
House $100,000 $ 100,000 - 
Loan $94,289 $94,289 - 
Default Probability (FHA Cumulative Claim Rate)^ 5.00% 3.50% 1.50% 
Default Loss Lender (23% balance) $21,686  $21,686  - 
Default Loss Borrower (6% balance) $5,657  $5,657  - 
Expected Loss Lender P*Loss $1,084  $759  $325  
Expected Loss Borrower P*Loss $283  $198  $85  
This example assumes counseling reduces probability of default by 30%, approximate magnitude in Hirad and 
Zorn study.  ^ FY 2000 Actuarial Review, 2001 Projected Cumulative Claim Rate 
 
Policy Proposal:  HUD Housing Counseling Funding (Section 106) HUDs Section 106 counseling 
budget is small relative to the market, small relative to HUDs budget, and should be increased.  
However, administration of these funds needs improvement.  Counseling funds are currently used for all 
types of assistance, including advice on finding an apartment and applying for reverse mortgages.  A 
dedicated line for pre- and post-purchase education will help expand the reach of the program.  HUD 
regulations prohibiting clients from paying a fee, and prohibiting lenders and real estate agents from 
partially covering fees for homebuyer services, should also be changed.  Tripartite payments from the 
consumer, public sector and private sector are consistent with the distribution of benefits education and 
counseling create.  HUD might even explore a matching grant mechanism to leverage private-sector 
contributions, or a sliding-scale fee based on the income of the counseled family.   
Policy Proposal:  Creating Incentives for Counseling In the late 1990s, FHA allowed buyers to 
reduce mortgage insurance premiums in exchange for taking a course and attending counseling.  That 
option was eliminated in the most recent FHA premium reductions, however.  Counseling providers have 
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suggested this discount strongly encouraged customers to seek pre-purchase services.  Reducing interest 
rates or mortgage insurance premiums may be justified given counselings role in reducing the risk of 
default.  However, these discount programs do incur costs that may reduce the numbers of homebuyers 
who can be served by a fixed amount of insurance in the near term.  Buyers mandated to take counseling 
may face timing and accessibility issues, as well, which will delay the buying process and frustrate 
borrowers, sellers, real estate agents and lenders.  Such requirements may also precipitate the use of low-
quality telephone or home study services, which have proven the least effective in reducing delinquency.  
Creating incentives for homebuyer counseling by offering discounts to borrowers in FHA and RHS 
programs, as well as state housing agency mortgage-revenue bond products, might help stimulate 
maturation of the industry, however. 
Policy Proposal:  Mainstreaming Counseling into Home Sales Another avenue for encouraging 
homebuyer education would be a modification of RESPA to include counseling as a dedicated line item 
on HUD-1 settlement forms.  This change would help promote transparency and institutionalize 
counseling into the homebuying process, particularly if combined with proposals to collect and 
disseminate HUD-1 data nationally.  Modifications of HUD-1 forms are often slow and controversial 
however, and the definition of each cost often is debated in court.  Homebuyer education might occur a 
year or more before a home sale closing; clear boundaries of what costs should be included for expenses 
incurred, and from how far back, would be required.  Documenting the type, provider and costs of 
counseling, however, will help establish benchmarks for the industry. 
Related to this proposal is encouraging all potential first-time homebuyers to attend homebuyer 
education classes before they search for a home or sign a purchase contract.  Likewise, during the three-
day right of rescission period granted under TILA, borrowers should be directed to homebuyer counseling 
agencies. 
Policy Proposal:  Financing Counseling Costs Another option is to permit counseling fees as an 
allowable cost for mortgage loans, exempt from the HOEPA regulations, up to a set amount (perhaps 
$300 to $500, depending on the market).  This fee would provide agencies with funds to counsel families 
they are serving, including required travel costs in sparsely populated areas.  Such a program would 
slightly increase interest costs to low-income borrowers, as costs would be spread out over the term of the 
loan, but would expand the ability of providers to capture revenue and build capacity.  
Policy Proposal:  Support and Expansion of Counseling Entities Many communities simply lack 
qualified providers of education and counseling.  Using state and local agencies, HUD could enhance the 
delivery system for homebuyer education.  State housing finance agencies could expand direct provision 
of services, as well as develop statewide networks of nonprofit providers.  Public housing agencies could 
fund homebuyer education efforts, especially, but not restricted to, households in the Family Self 
Sufficiency and Section 8 to homeownership programs.  More homebuyer education providers could also 
be included in local allocations of HOME and CDBG, with an emphasis on the development of new 
providers in areas with no homebuyer programs.  Federal support for the Neighborhood Reinvestment 
Corporation, Catholic Charities, AHECI, Housing Partnership Network, National Urban League, the 
National Council of La Raza and other national intermediaries could also focus as much on developing 
providers as supporting existing ones. 
Policy Proposal:  Establish Quality Standards  Given the enormous variation in services, quality 
standards for homebuyer education are an important issue.  HUD began certification of counseling 
programs in the 1970s, but primarily as a screen to determine eligibility to apply for funds.  Standards for 
curriculum and program quality have been set by national umbrella organizations, such as AHECI and 
Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, but the industry is fragmented into for-profit and nonprofit 
provider networks.69  Federal standards, which allow for local flexibility, might help promote uniformity.  
Oversight and enforcement of such standards should not create barriers to expanded services.  Similar to 
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other industries, standards should be clear to the consumer, and compliance predominately voluntary.  
State housing agencies might play an important role in establishing and enforcing standards, especially in 
their role as a funder of state homebuyer education and counseling programs. A multi-agency task force 
should be established to examine the homebuyer education industry and issue provisional standards 
defining the minimum criteria for a quality pre-purchase education program. 
Policy Proposal:  Require Counseling  Several proposals have been drafted in response to predatory 
lending suggesting certain "high-cost mortgages" defined by HOEPA, with rates, fees and terms that are 
difficult for borrowers to understand or manage, should require counseling prior to closing.  Since 
borrowers tapping these loans are likely to be more at risk than other borrowers, this seems an appropriate 
triage of education and counseling services.  However, these borrowers may be least able to afford such 
services, and requiring counseling may pressure providers to offer the fastest and lowest-cost services 
(which may not be of the appropriate quality or intensity). 
 
E.) Predatory versus Aggressive Lending 
Concerns have been mounting over the behavior of so-called predatory lenders who target 
homeowners and offer mortgages with high rates, unfavorable terms and unfair fees.  Such lenders 
misrepresent or obscure details of the loan, or target borrowers for repeated refinancing at higher rates or 
fees simply to generate lender profits as opposed to benefit the borrower.  Recent news accounts of 
mortgage borrowers being harmed by unscrupulous lenders certainly have captured the attention of policy 
makers and industry.  The idea that lenders might jeopardize a persons home by layering on debt that 
cannot be repaid is generally agreed to be unfair, but defining which loans and lenders are inappropriate is 
less straightforward.  Predatory practices might be roughly grouped into five categories: 
(1) Loans that charge higher interest rates than the risk level involved; 
(2) Loans with higher fees than is standard relative to the service provided, including fees charged for 
multiple, successive refinancing of a loan by the same lender over a short period of time which 
results in no net gain for borrowers; 
(3) Loans that bundle financial products that offer little comparative value to consumers;  
(4) Loans that are underwritten with debt-to-income and debt-to-asset values that exceed levels a 
borrower can reasonably expect to repay; 
(5) Prepayment penalties, balloon payments, and mandatory arbitration clauses, in combination with 
other practices, that entrap borrowers in high-cost loans.   
Loans with high interest rates, particular fees or terms may actually reasonably account for added risks 
and costs, and may be in the best interest of borrowers. For example, subprime loans, which carry higher 
interest rates, are more likely to refinance when interest rate decline.  Investors in these notes have their 
principal returned at a time when rates of return on alternative investments are relatively low. This 
increases investor risk, the returns they demand, and ultimately the cost of these loans.  Only loans that 
take advantage of customers to achieve supernormal profits are properly labeled predatory.  Some have 
blamed lax state and federal enforcement for the spread of predatory practices.  Many of the fraudulent or 
misleading practices used by predatory lenders are already regulated or illegal.  However, other practices 
are not illegal, and in fact what some lenders might view as fair risk-based pricing or effective consumer 
marketing is perceived by some advocates as de facto predatory lending. 
Despite the high level of inquiry involved, it has been challenging to agree on what specific 
combination of practices are defined as being predatory, and likewise hard to estimate the number of 
loans or lenders that might be involved.  Some states and localities have passed limits on loan terms, but 
their ultimate power to regulate lending is debatable.  Aggressive lending by some lenders in these states 
decreased after these laws were passed, leading some to wonder if these regulations went too far.  A 
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growing number of lending professionals speculate national regulations and standards are required for 
regional and national financial institutions to operate efficiently, but are leery of the impact of national 
regulations similar to anti-predatory lending laws passed in some states and localities.  Others in the 
mortgage industry claim that practices deemed predatory are already illegal, or will be driven out by 
lenders need to preserve the reputation of their institutions.70.  Preserving aggressive practices that 
legitimately expand credit for marginal borrowers, while prohibiting predatory or discriminatory 
practices, is a delicate balance.  
Policy Proposals: Education, Enforcement and Balanced Regulation  In June of 2000, a task force 
set up by HUD and the Department of Treasury published a report, Curbing Predatory Home Mortgage 
Lending.  Based on a series of forums and research, recommendations were made for new legislation and 
regulation in four areas:  
(1) Consumer literacy and disclosure. 
• Increasing access to counseling for HOEPA loan applicants; 
• Amending RESPA and TILA to make information more accessible to consumers, including 
improving accuracy of the good faith estimates; 
• Increasing reporting requirements, and the number of lenders, reporting under HMDA 
(2) Prohibition of harmful sales practices.  
• Reducing loan flipping through increased restrictions on successive loan refinancing. 
(3) Restrict abusive terms. 
• Establishing maximum debt to income ratios and residual income guidelines. 
• Lowering HOEPA interest rate triggers, including more fees in the HOEPA threshold, and 
lowering minimum fee triggering HOEPA provisions. 
(4) Adapt oversight to market conditions and structure.  
• Expanding HOEPA to include contractors, appraisers, and other actors in real estate 
transactions 
 
The Federal Reserve and other agencies have implemented many of these proposals, and a number of 
legislative responses have also been drafted (see Appendix Table C).  Many states have created legislation 
to regulate predatory practices locally, creating a complicated web of restrictions that increase costs to 
lenders who operate in multiple markets.  A new national law could reduce overall compliance costs and 
simplify practices.  Federal regulators might also work to review interpretations of existing regulations 
and further enhance enforcement in cooperation with state and local authorities.  However, substantive 
new protections that target abusive lending practices should not unduly interfere with the flow of credit or 
narrow consumers options in legitimate transactions, however.  Efforts by industry to develop and adhere 
to standards are promising.  Agreements among financial institutions and secondary markets to prohibit 
the financing of up-front credit insurance, limit back-end prepayment penalties, and cease the use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses are positive steps.  Lenders should also ensure that borrowers receive the 
lowest-cost loan for which they qualify, minimizing direct and indirect fees.  Borrowers also should have 
increased opportunities to receive pre-purchase homebuyer education.  Meanwhile, competition in 
mortgage markets, led by the GSEs and FHA, should be focused on communities and populations with 
limited borrowing options currently.  Congress should continue to monitor this issue in order to ensure 
that recent gains in homeownership are not undermined by irresponsible or inequitable lending practices. 
 
                                                          
70 See: Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy ,The Law and Economics of Remedies for Predatory Lending, Paper for 
Changing Financial Markets and Community Development, Federal Reserve Systems Second Community Affairs Research 
Conference. April 5-6, 2001. 
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F.) Individual Development Accounts and Promotion of Financial Literacy  
Many households lack savings and financial literacy skills.  Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) 
reward the monthly savings of working-poor families, who often are trying to buy their first home.  This 
reward is provided through the use of matching funds that typically come from a variety of private and 
public sources.  Similar to 401(k)s, IDAs make it easier for low-income families to build financial assets.  
More importantly, IDA participants typically also receive valuable financial education and counseling.   
IDA programs exist in over 250 communities, serving at least 5,000 people.  The 1996 Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act allows states to include IDAs in welfare reform 
plans, and the use of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) funds for an IDA match.  The 
Assets for Independence Act of 1998 authorizes HHS to administer a five-year demonstration of IDAs.   
Demonstration program results show very low-income families actually save at a higher rate than the 
less-poor, with an average savings of $900 annually. Program costs are as much as 2.7 times the amount 
deposited, although returns to scale and experience may decrease costs slightly over time.  A generic 
program with a standardized design is possible, similar to Individual Retirement Accounts, but programs 
designed to aid very-low-income families need to offer more comprehensive services and require costly 
oversight.71 
Related to IDAs is the Treasury Departments First Accounts program, part of the CDFI Bank 
Enterprise Awards (BEA).72  This program provides low-income households access to low-cost bank 
accounts provided by private institutions.  Combined with financial literacy education, these accounts 
become ideal complements for IDA programs.  
With increased funding and favorable changes to welfare regulations, a greater number of community-
based nonprofit organizations should be able to apply for funding through the HHS and start-up 
programs.  IDAs are emerging as an important incentive for learning economic skills and also help 
overcome the wealth barriers to owning a home.   
Policy Proposal:  IDA Tax Credit  Recent proposals have been levied suggesting a 100 percent tax 
credit to financial institutions to provide 1:1 matches of up to $500 annually per qualified individual 
saving in an IDA.  Since few lower-income households have enough tax liability to use a tax credit 
themselves, these proposals focus on tax subsidies for financial institutions, which may have sufficient 
tax liability to value a credit.  Like other tax credits, this would need to be a capped and allocated credit, 
presumably through the CDFI Fund, similar to the New Markets Tax Credit.   
The cost of administering a match program, as well as monitoring the use of funds and client 
adherence to program regulations should not be under-estimated, however.  IDA programs must develop 
systems to track clients and their funds over many years.  Some portion of families will violate terms of 
the program, and recapture rules will be required.  While it is important to promote further innovations in 
IDA programs operated by states, foundations and nonprofits, these pilot programs are likely to need 
more time to evolve.  
 
G.) Employer Assisted Homeownership 
Another avenue for engaging potential homebuyers are employers.  Pilot programs nationally have 
shown employer assisted homeownership could be an effective vehicle for helping meet the housing 
needs of working families and for stabilizing neighborhoods.  Employer assisted housing (EAH) includes 
referrals, homebuyer education, downpayment assistance and even investments in the development of 
                                                          
71 Mark Schreiner, Michael Sherraden, Margaret Clancy, Lissa Johnson, Jami Curley, Min Zahn, Sondra Beverly, Michal 
Grinstein-Weiss, Asset Accumulation in Low-Resource Households: Evidence from Individual Development Accounts. 
Paper for Changing Financial Markets and Community Development, Federal Reserve Systems Second Community Affairs 
Research Conference. April 5-6, 2001. 
72 http://www.ustreas.gov/cdfi/programs/bea/pdf/01_firstaccounts.pdf 
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housing.  Employers who help subsidize the housing costs of their workers use the program as a 
recruitment tool and to build a more stable work force.  Employers who invest in housing in targeted 
neighborhoods use these programs to improve the quality of life of their customers, employees and the 
surrounding community.  Yet, most corporations are unaware of other employers who have programs, as 
well as the benefits perceived by employers engaged in EAH programs. There is a dearth of information 
of the benefits of EAH, as well as on the programmatic details of how to establish a program.   
Policy Proposal:  EAH Information Dissemination  Federal grants to outside intermediaries, or 
programs delivered through existing federal agencies, could provide information, referrals and 
publications to help employers develop EAH programs.  It is possible private-sector trade associations 
could work in partnership to document and disseminate information, as well.  
Policy Proposal:  Special Tax Rules for EAH  Federal tax laws and corporate accounting rules do 
not provide incentives for employers who might otherwise offer housing assistance to their employees or 
surrounding communities.73  In the few cases when employers have offered employees below-market rate 
loans for the purchase of a home, the accounting for expenses has been complicated.  One approach 
would be to allow the differential between the rate the corporation receives and a benchmark rate set by 
law, to be treated as an expense that can be used to offset taxable income.  Such a regulation will be 
challenging to craft, however, as the risk and interest rate appropriate to each loan or investment will 
vary.  Another option is to allow EAH to be a qualified option under cafeteria tax-free benefit plans.  
Existing tax laws allow employees to select from a menu of health care and other benefits up to a 
maximum value annually, none of which is taxed as income.  By allowing EAH to be added to the menu 
employees would have the flexibility to forego other benefits and opt for EAH benefits instead.  A variant 
of this approach is to expand the cafeteria benefit cap for employer-assisted housing uses.  With an 
increased amount of tax-exempt benefits more employers and employees may be willing to participate.  
Determining how and when an employer might be allowed to use this option, however, would likely 
require highly-detailed regulations.  Another tax approach is to create a new allocated corporate tax credit 
to partially offset the cost to employers of providing EAH benefits to their employees under certain 
circumstances.  The eligibility rules and allocation system would again be quite complicated.  While all of 
these tax changes might prove powerful tools to leverage private-sector support of targeted 
homeownership programs, altering tax rules to allow EAH as part of existing cafeteria benefit plans might 
be enough to inspire corporate interest, without much cost to the federal government. 
 
H.) Balancing Below-Market-Rate Mortgages with the Need to Tap Future Home Equity 
One of the innovations by nonprofits and local governments to promote low-income homeownership 
in recent decades has been the advent of deeply subsidized, very low-interest rate mortgages.  While small 
in number nationally, with rates sometimes as low as zero percent and terms exceeding 30 years, these 
loans are far more supportive of affordable payments than any products available from the private sector.  
Yet, media reports of borrowers with these loans refinancing to much higher rate loans are undoubtedly 
true.  Low-income families often struggle to manage consumer loan debts or need cash for emergencies, 
and therefore tap into their home equity.  In December 2001, the Federal Reserve considered banning the 
refinance of lower-rate loans, but determined such an outright ban would limit the ability of needy 
families to access home equity.74  While this appears to be a sound decision, prudent financial institutions 
should examine these borrowers and the limited choices available to them.  Innovative, small-scale 
programs could offer carefully designed second mortgages or debt consolidation loans, combined with 
enhanced levels of disclosure and borrower education or counseling.  Nonprofits and local governments 
originating deeply-subsidized loans should also require counseling as a condition of subordinating to a 
                                                          
73 It should be noted government, universities and religious organizations often provide housing benefits to employees.  The tax 
treatment of these benefits varies based on the relationship and institution type (parsonage allowances, for example, are tax-
exempt for clergy). 
74 The Federal Reserve is still considering additional proposals. 
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home equity loan. Refinancing subsidized loans is an issue that warrants continued monitoring by 
regulators and national advocates of sustainable homeownership.  
Policy Proposal:  Oversight of Consumer Credit Counseling:  Related to this issue are financial 
companies appearing to take advantage of consumers who are trying to get control of their debt.  There 
are many legitimate options available for consumers facing difficult debt burdens.  Consumer Credit 
Counseling Service (CCCS) agencies are nonprofit organizations dedicated to budget and credit education 
and counseling, funded by creditors and customers.  In general, these agencies provide high-quality 
advice and services to customers within clear standards of practice.  Yet newer firms, many with highly-
paid executives, enormous marketing budgets and exclusive relationships with high-cost lenders, have 
evolved.75  These firms are regulated by states, but often operate without much scrutiny. In addition to 
setting standards for pre-purchase counseling, federal and state regulators should also closely monitor 
post-purchase credit counseling, particularly that provided by for-profit companies, or via puppet 
nonprofits created by lenders.   
 
                                                          
75Christopher H. Schmidt, Heather Timmons, and John Cady.  A Debt Trap for the Unwary.  Business Week,  Oct. 29, 2001.   
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SECTION 5: DEVELOPING AND PRESERVING THE SUPPLY OF AFFORDABLE UNITS SUITABLE FOR 
HOMEOWNERSHIP 
A.) Developing New Affordable Units for Homeowners 
Even if financial or information barriers that might frustrate low-income renter households from 
buying a home can be overcome, households may still be constrained by a lack of adequate housing units 
at an appropriate sales price in a desired location.   
Because of the fixed costs involved in building new houses, and the relatively attractive profit margins 
involved in building higher-value homes, very few affordable owner-occupied homes are being produced 
today.  First-time buyers cannot afford the price of new single-family units or condominiums, and are 
instead left to purchase existing units, many of which are declining in quality.  A very small number of 
units are developed using mortgage revenue bonds or FHA-insured loans, often in combination with 
subsidies from the CDBG or HOME programs, but overall federal support for developing a supply of 
owner-occupied units is meager. 
Using one set of mortgage underwriting assumptions, only 44 percent of all owner-occupied units in 
1999 were valued in a range that would be affordable to a household earning 80 percent or less of area 
median income (Table 9).  Focusing only on new units added to the housing stock from 1997 to 1999, 
using the same assumptions, 540,000 units were affordably priced, two-thirds of which are manufactured 
units.76  Overall, very few affordable units are being created today for low-income homebuyers. 
Table 9 
Affordable Owner-Occupied Units By Age (in thousands) 
 Built Last 2 
Years 
Total 
Total Units 1,830 68,780 
    Unaffordable Value Units 1,290 38,400 
    Affordable Value Units 540 30,381 
    Affordable Manufactured Units 375 5,535 
   
Affordable as Percent of Total Units 30% 44% 
Manufactured as Percent of Affordable Units 69% 18% 
Source: 1999 American Housing Survey, authors calculations. 
 Note: approximately 1.1 million mobile units are defined as rental units and excluded 
from this table. 
 
Policy Proposal:  Single Family Development Tax Credit  According to the National Association of 
Home Builders, approximately 100,000 to 120,000 units are built annually by private developers at sales 
prices below $100,000.  One explanation for the lack of private-sector homebuilders developing 
affordable homes is the so called appraisal gap that occurs when the costs of development exceed what 
fair market values will support.  Except when subsidies bridge the gap between development costs and 
market values, housing suitable for homeownership is not being developed.77 
In rental housing, the Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) subsidizes development cost gaps; 
using the equity from selling tax credits to investors makes developing units in targeted areas 
economically feasible.  One proposal, developed in part by the Bush Administration, suggests a new 
homeownership tax credit.  This new tax credit would be similar to the LIHTC, in the sense that 
developers would compete to receive tax credit allocations from state housing finance agencies.  Credits 
would cover the gap between the total cost of developing, or substantially rehabilitating, a unit and the 
                                                          
76 Michael Collins, David Crowe and Michael Carliner, "Supply Side Constraints to Home Ownership," Joint Center for Housing 
Studies of Harvard University Low-Income Home Ownership Symposium, November 2000. 
77 Another factor limiting the creation of new affordable owner-occupied homes are regulations, including federal requirements 
for lead-paint abatement or energy efficiency, and local code and zoning laws. These regulations add to the fixed costs of 
developing units, making the development of affordable units less viable in the marketplace. 
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fair market value of the property.  Unlike the LIHTC, this would be a one-year tax credit, and only homes 
in low-income Census tracts would be eligible.  As proposed, each state would receive annual tax credits 
amounting to $1.75 per capita for use only in that year.  Tax credits would be worth up to 50 percent of 
the cost of the home, but could not be used to reduce the price of the home below market value. 
Like the LIHTC, close project monitoring of homeownership credit projects would be required.  The 
value of this credit will rely on two crucial numbers, market value and total development costs.  Since 
market values cannot be determined by capitalizing rents, as it is with the rental LIHTC credit, careful 
appraisals of market value will be needed.  While it is possible formulaic automated appraisal systems 
could be used, in markets with few comparable sales, accurate appraisals may be difficult to obtain.  Also, 
determining a fair amount for total development costs could also be problematic as they could be inflated 
with higher-cost projects than otherwise warranted.   
Although designed as an urban revitalization tool, the development of scattered site purchase-
rehabilitation tax-credit housing projects, which have the greatest potential to revitalize neighborhoods 
may be unlikely under this tax credit.  Homeownership tax credits would most efficiently be used to 
develop larger-scale projects in one location.  As a result, developers would likely prefer to build new 
units on subdivided parcels, rather than renovate existing units.  Tax-credit units will be concentrated in 
low-income areas, perhaps stimulating development of new units in housing markets with an existing 
over-supply of units. 
While this proposal warrants further analysis and refinement, it is an example of an innovative way 
federal tax policy could spur the development of affordable units suitable for homeownership.78 
Policy Proposals:  Expand Existing Programs  HOME block grant funds can be used for purchase, 
rehabilitation, or new construction, as well as direct housing subsidies to families.  Over $1.8 billion in 
HOME funds are allocated each year among states, localities, and local governments, which is matched 
by $450 million in local public or private funds.  Designed to be locally-controlled, state housing finance 
agencies receive 40 percent of total HOME funding, and localities receive 60 percent, based on an 
allocation formula.  The program has proven an important tool for creating affordable homeownership 
opportunities, however.  HOME subsidizes an estimated 5,500 new units suitable for homeownership 
each year, and nearly one in three homebuyers assisted by HOME earns 50 percent or less of area median 
income.79  HOME-assisted owner-occupied units sold within 15 years must be purchased by another 
HOME-eligible family, or else the seller must repay a portion of the HOME subsidy.  HOME has proven 
a valuable program to promote low-income homeownership, and could be expanded.  HUD could re-
focus training, research and reporting on how HOME is best used to develop and redevelop units suitable 
for homeownership, as well as review regulations stipulating specific building standards and materials 
which serve to inflate total development costs. 
One small, but effective program for developing affordable homeownership units is self-help housing.  
Administered by HUD, RHS and often associated with the extensive network of nonprofit agencies 
affiliated with Habitat for Humanity, self-help requires homebuyers to participate in the construction of 
their homes, creating greater pride of ownership, facilitating home maintenance skills, and providing 
lower-cost units.  Approximately 65 percent of the labor needed to build is the buyers "sweat equity," 
allowing them to purchase the house at a more affordable cost.  Self-help borrowers have exceptional 
track records  RHS default rates for self-help, for example, are lower than other 502 loans.  Some new 
homeowners have even used construction skills learned through building their home to get other jobs. 
Administration of these projects is expensive, and buyers need extensive support, however.  Nationally, 
fewer than 10,000 homes are constructed under various self-help initiatives annually.  HUD, RHS and 
state and local housing agencies could evaluate an expansion of these programs, in partnership with local 
                                                          
78 The LIHTC can be used in lease-purchase homeownership projects.  The New Markets Tax Credit may also be used to provide 
subsidy to investors in housing development limited partnerships. 
79 HUD HOME program data (ten year cumulative), 2001. 
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community groups and Habitat for Humanity.  In rural markets, tribal lands and other hard-to-develop 
areas, this approach may increase the supply of affordable units while also helping support sustainable 
homeownership for low-income families. 
 
B.) Manufactured Housings Critical Role 
Manufactured homes, labeled mobile homes by the Census, are built to National Home Construction 
and Safety Standards (the HUD-code).  These units are built in a factory, on a chassis with wheels, and 
have a seal certifying the unit meets national uniform housing code performance requirements.  HUD-
code factory-built units can save 20 percent of the development costs of a site-built home.  There are 
other forms of factory-built housing, such as modular and panelized construction, but these designs are 
not built to the national HUD-code but rather to local codes, often called Uniform Statewide Building 
Code (USBC) Building Officials Code Administrators (BOCA).  These forms of factory-built housing 
also provide costs savings, but not at the scale of HUD-code units. 
There are over 8 million manufactured, HUD-code units in the U.S., representing two-thirds of 
affordable owner-occupied units added to the stock in recent years (Table 6 and Appendix Table J) and a 
growing portion of all new housing.  Not surprisingly, 67 percent of manufactured housing occupants 
have incomes below 80 percent of the area median.  A substantial share of the growth in low-income 
homeownership evidenced in the 1990s has been driven by manufactured homebuyers (Appendix Table 
G).   
The manufactured home industry began in the 1930s, and grew rapidly in the 1960s and 1970s.  In 
1976, legislation was passed to bring standards and quality controls to the industry, including the HUD-
code and factory certification.  Nevertheless, nearly 3 million older manufactured units are still in the 
occupied housing stock (Table 10).  Many of these older units are of low quality, poorly designed and are 
placed in unsightly trailer parks.  However, after 1980, and particularly in the 1990s, the manufactured 
home industry has evolved to deliver an increasingly quality product aimed at competing with entry-level 
site built units.  The majority of units placed after 1995 are double-wide, that is two chassis placed side 
by side (see Appendix Table K).  More units are also placed on larger lots owned by the occupant and 
titled as real estate than in the past.  Recent innovations in design, including two-stories and attached 
garages, are a much more viable structure type for urban-infill developments.  Many stereotypes and 
perceptions continue in this market, however, which fuel treatment of manufactured housing units in 
public policy, development and mortgage finance.   
Table 10 
Housing Units Occupied Year Around in 1999 by the Year Built or Placed 
Year Built Non-
Manufactured 
(Mobile) 
Manufactured Total Share 
Manufactured 
Per Year 
Cumulative 
Manufactured 
Stock 
Pre 1920 8,833,045 - 8,833,045 0%  
1920s 4,961,698 - 4,961,698 0%  
1930s 5,692,148 37,505 5,729,653 1% 37,505 
1940s 7,408,183 16,257 7,424,440 0% 53,762 
1950s 12,188,783 102,806 12,291,589 1% 156,568 
1960s 13,623,507 601,451 14,224,958 4% 758,019 
1970s 18,504,284 2,106,798 20,611,082 10% 2,864,817 
1980s 13,237,179 1,519,002 14,756,181 10% 4,383,819 
1990s 11,546,313 2,400,130 13,946,443 17% 6,783,949 
Total 95,995,140 6,783,949 102,800,000 7% 7% 
American Housing Survey, 1999 
 
The financing system for manufactured housing can be segmented into two categories: (1) for those 
buyers placing their unit on owned-land, often titled as conventional real estate, and (2) those who buy a 
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unit and place it on leased land.80  Many low-income buyers, especially those living in leased-land 
communities, finance their home with installment personal property, or so called consumer chattel 
loans.  Until very recently, few banks, savings and loans, or credit unions have been willing to finance 
manufactured homes as real estate, except in cases where land is owned or a land lease is in place with a 
length longer than the mortgage loan term.81  Lenders are also reluctant to provide financing for the 
purchase of an existing manufactured home, especially if it has been moved from its original location.  
The potential mobility of these units (although rarely exercised), and the fact tenants on leased land have 
little protection from eviction, has hampered the development of affordable loan products.  Lax 
underwriting practices of the 1990s, combined with the collateral risks, and the borrower characteristics 
common in low-income markets, have resulted in many lenders refusing to finance manufactured housing 
loans.  Stereotypes related to class bias also are pervasive as poor people in trailer parks continue to be 
judged derogatorily by local officials, real estate professionals and lenders.  Nevertheless, occupants of 
existing units have limited potential to build equity if they cannot finance the repair, replacement or re-
sale of their homes.82 
In 2000, the Manufactured Housing Improvement Act was passed to mandate improvements in the 
installation process.  The new law potentially reduces the collateral risk lenders face that a unit may be 
improperly installed or placed on a faulty foundation.  While there is hope the new law may signal a 
future marked by greater innovations in design and finance, in recent years many manufactured housing 
lenders and developers have experienced record high delinquencies and repossessions.  The next decade 
will prove if these growing pains can be resolved to form a market that better serves low-income families. 
Policy Proposal:  Encouraging GSE Participation in Manufactured Housing Lending  Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac have traditionally not supported a secondary market for manufactured housing 
loans classified as personal property.  New products are being introduced for tenants of land-lease 
communities that, under specific circumstances, allow borrowers to access credit as real estate loans.  
Other products, including products for developers of manufactured housing communities, are also being 
developed, but progress has been slow.  HUD should encourage both Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
expand products for HUD-code structures used as owner-occupied housinga market dominated by 
lower-income borrowers in underserved areas.  Congress could also reaffirm that the GSE charters allow 
the financing of personal property loans, and continue to include provisions supporting manufactured 
housing as part of low-income homeownership policy. 
Policy Proposal:  State Classification of Owner-Occupied Manufactured Units as Real Estate  In 
most states, manufactured units may be classified as real estate.  However, over a dozen states do not 
permit HUD-code units on leased-land to be legally defined as real estate.83  As a result, FHA and other 
mortgage programs cannot legally participate in mortgage loans on manufactured units in these states.  
States should be encouraged to carefully review the impact of these legal classifications on borrowers.  
Without changes to state laws, federal policy actions will be moot. 
Policy Proposal:  Reinvigorate FHA Title I and II Manufactured Housing Programs  FHA Title I 
can guarantee loans for manufactured homes, for manufactured homes and the property on which they are 
located, or for loans to purchase just a manufactured home lot.  FHA Title II can be used where the home 
                                                          
80 Leased land historically has been called a trailer park.  Given new units are not called trailers and rarely are moved, the terms 
leased-land community or leasehold estate are preferred.  While these units are a blend of owning a unit and renting land, 
the Census classifies these households as homeowners in its statistics.  Classifying occupants who do not own the 
manufactured home lot as renters lowers the homeownership rate in the 1999 American Housing Survey from 67% to 64%. 
81 In 2001, Freddie Mac created a loan product for leased-land units, stipulating the lease term must be five years greater than the 
mortgage term; Fannie Mae offers a similar product requiring a ten-year differential. These loans offer rates of 3% or more 
below chattel loans. 
82 Contrary to popular belief, manufactured homes can and do appreciate in value at similar rates to site-built homes, particularly 
when land is owned, units are well designed and properly installed. 
83 Washington, Montana, Nevada, Utah, Nebraska, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Florida, South Carolina, West Virginia, 
Maryland, New Jersey, Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Minnesota did not recognize these units as of 1999. 
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is permanently placed on land and treated like real estate.  These programs are used for fewer than 10 
percent of all manufactured home placements in a given year, however, despite FHAs emphasis on 
serving low-income borrowers.  Inefficient administration of these programs, low loan limits, and other 
restrictions create barriers few lenders are willing to confront.  HUD could streamline both programs, 
increase loan limits and encourage use of these products for purchase, re-purchase, refinance and home 
improvement lending for HUD-code units.  FHAs recent increases in insurance premiums and lender 
standards might begin to revive the struggling, negative cash flow program.84  In the 1980s, Ginnie Mae 
issued a limited number of eagle certifications allowing lenders to receive a Ginnie Mae guarantee in the 
secondary market.  Few lenders use Ginnie Maes manufactured home loan programs today, in part 
because of regulations put in place to stem high losses in this product line in the past.  Yet, competition 
among lenders would be enhanced if Ginnie Mae once again supported this program.  FHA might also 
investigate whether the Title I and II loan programs are the most appropriate mechanism to serve 
borrowers purchasing HUD-code homes.  A non-conditional insurance, similar to the 203b program, may 
be called for, given recent changes in the industry.  As more community banks and mortgage companies 
enter this market and responsibly underwrite loans, boom and bust cycles could be dampened if FHA 
provided a consistent source of credit with clear and effective standards.85  FHA and HUD need to 
allocate more staff and resources to explore options for supporting this segment of homeownership.  HUD 
should appoint a new deputy assistant secretary for manufactured housing and establish a mandate to 
focus on manufactured housing finance. 
Policy Proposal:  Revise FHA Programs for Manufactured Housing Developments  At the 
developer level, owners of land-lease communities also lack access to credit for new communities, or 
estate developments, and for replacing infrastructure.  Developers suggest FHA loan limits are too low 
and the application process is inefficient for loans to develop manufactured home communities.  Too 
often, FHA local office staff, lenders and other actors in the transaction will not consider manufactured 
home projects due to a lack of clarity on allowable uses and inflexible processing systems.  FHA needs to 
review these programs to enhance their utility, train HUD staff and lenders, and clarify regulations 
allowing the use of these programs for the development of manufactured home communities.  
Policy Proposal:  Revise RHS 502 Programs to Allow Manufactured Housing  RHS 502 direct 
loan and guarantee programs will support manufactured housing loans, but requires that the home and 
land be included in one loan financed as real property, and that the home be purchased from approved 
dealer-contractors.  Very few of these loans are made annually, despite the preponderance of 
manufactured units in rural areas.  The program could be modified to allow personal property loans in 
specific circumstances, including re-sales of existing units and replacement of existing manufactured 
homes with new units, in addition to newly placed homes titled as real estate.  RHS could also review its 
concerns about authorized dealers and installers given new federal legislation and improved state 
regulations.  RHS should work closely with HUD and FHA to revise these programs and improve their 
ability to serve borrowers in the manufactured home market. 
Policy Proposal:  Clarify Allowable Use of Manufactured Units  Design advances have proven 
manufactured units can be used in urban infill developments.  In addition to savings in production costs, 
factory-built units dramatically reduce security costs and speed up the development process.  Explicitly, 
few prohibitions exist to using manufactured units in urban areas, but local administrators and developers 
often discourage the use of HUD-code units in affordable housing projects.  Making clear that 
manufactured units are allowable in the administrative rules of existing affordable housing programs 
(HOME, CDBG, LIHTC) may help overcome resistance.   
                                                          
84 24 CFR Parts 201 and 202 in the Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 216, November 7, 2001 increased the Title I and II premium to 
100 basis points and increased asset requirement for lenders/dealers. 
85 In 2000, the securitization of manufactured housing chattel loans half to previous years levels; despite only a 20 percent drop 
in shipments.  Some industry analysts suspect the differential in loan volume is made by local lenders, although it is unclear if 
these are real estate loans or unsecuritized chattel loans. 
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Policy Proposal:  Encourage Cooperative Ownership of Leasehold Estates  Nearly three million 
families live in manufactured homes sited in land-lease communities where they pay a monthly ground 
rent to a landlord.  Landlord quality is uneven in any rental housing market, but none more than in 
manufactured housing.  Tales of frequent rent increases, little or no infrastructure maintenance and 
excessive rules governing what tenants can and cannot do are common.  Unfortunately, the ground-lease 
arrangement is ripe for exploitation because, unlike an apartment building, the landlord extracts rent but is 
not responsible for any maintenance to the individual resident-owned housing units.  Moreover, it is 
difficult and expensive to move a manufactured home (typically $3,000-5,000), essentially tying low-
income and low-wealth occupants to a site.   
In some cases, tenants of estates have collectively purchased their community as a cooperative.  These 
resident-owned communities allow owners to have control of their community, acquire long-term site 
commitments and have transformed their homes into real assets.  Several states have laws providing 
residents the right of first refusal as leased-land communities are placed on the market.  Currently, New 
Hampshire has forty-four cooperatively-owned manufactured housing parks, California has over a 
hundred, and Florida has nearly five hundred.  Despite the challenges of management and finance, the 
benefits of this ownership structure are significant.  State laws offering right of first refusal are important, 
as are local intermediaries and sources of capital for financing these ownership structures.  States could be 
encouraged to pass right of first refusal laws, and HUD, FHA and the GSEs could develop programs to 
support these cooperative financing arrangements. Support for cooperatives might also include funding 
for intermediaries to help negotiate and finance sales in collaboration with residents.  State laws offering 
first-refusal rights might also consider ways to balance rights of property owners seeking to transfer 
ownership, particularly multi-state REITs and individuals transferring a community to an heir.86  
Policy Proposal:  Developing and Supporting Trailer Replacement Programs   Millions of 
existing manufactured units are in the housing stock in deteriorated condition.  Many were placed before 
1976 HUD-code reforms; others were placed in more recent years, but poorly installed or maintained.  
Many of these units need to be replaced in the near future.  Several innovative programs have explored 
ways to swap dilapidated mobile homes and trailers for more modern manufactured or modular units.  
Other programs have attempted to maximize the scrap value of aging units.  Replacing aging units with 
better-designed and affordably-financed housing will help improve the aesthetics of many communities, 
as well as provide families with safer, more stable housing with increased opportunities for wealth-
building.  
 
C.) Acquisition and Redevelopment of Units Suitable for Owner-Occupants 
The process of financing the production of new homes has several distinct stages, beginning with 
raising capital for the acquisition of real estate, then capital to fund development, and finally capital to 
finance construction.  After completion, permanent financing takes over.  Acquisition finance is a fairly 
well established market, borrowers seeking capital for development and construction, with little collateral 
in the project, carry high risks.  Many lenders do know how to underwrite and manage these risks. Those 
who do, lack any systematic route to sell these loans in the secondary market.  Currently held in portfolio, 
these loans also carry high interest rates.  If the secondary market could provide liquidity and lower-cost 
capital to the construction lending market, the production of single-family units suitable for 
homeownership could grow. 
                                                          
86 The Washington state supreme court struck down a "right of first refusal" law as interfering with the right to sell property.  
New Hampshire and other states have addressed this by utilizing a 60-day notice, wherein the seller has to negotiate in good 
faith with tenants.  States could add protections for estate owners, such as exempting transfers between related entities, 
restricting the provision to arms-length sales, or only trigger the right of refusal in cases where the property will no longer be 
used for manufactured housing (a change in use). 
04/11/02 Homeownership and the Role of Federal Housing Policy 46 
Policy Proposal:  Finalize FASIT Regulation  An existing structure, the Financial Asset 
Securitization Investment Trust (FASIT), provides a vehicle for securitizing construction, development 
and other types of loans.  FASITs are similar to Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits (REMICs) in 
tax treatment, facilitating a pool of loans being packaged as mortgage-backed securities.  The Treasury 
Department, however, never issued regulations for FASITs.  Issuing these regulations could potentially 
spur a needed secondary market for construction and development loans. 
Policy Proposal:  Enhance the Market for Construction and Development Lending  Federal 
programs could support the evolution of construction and development lending.  FHA could insure 
individual loans, or provide a credit enhancement to a pool of loans.  Similarly, state housing finance 
agencies could expand lending outside of permanent-only or construction-to-permanent structures.  The 
Federal Home Loan Banks, through the Mortgage Partnership Programs, as well as other GSEs, could 
also support construction and development loan secondary markets. These strategies have the potential to 
decrease costs and increase liquidity, especially for urban in-fill projects where the lack of financing is a 
significant constraint to development. 
 
D.) Preservation of Homeownership and Units Suitable for Owner-Occupants 
An estimated $136 billion is spent annually by homeowners on residential maintenance, repair and 
improvement.87  Home improvement, repair and remodeling ensure owner-occupied homes continue to 
provide housing that keeps up with modern standards of quality and design.  
Home improvement loans typically require inspections and irregular draws on the loan amount as 
work is completedrequiring regional or national lenders to find local oversight.  These loans also 
include risks of construction, including shoddy work or fraudulent contractors.  Unfortunately, home 
improvement lending has become an entry point for predatory lending practices, by lenders and 
contractors serving as loan brokers.  These financial and reputation risks, combined with the relatively 
high fixed-transaction costs of small loans, have reduced the number of lenders willing to administer 
these loans.  Most lenders today prefer to make home equity loans, or unsecured consumer loans, because 
these loans are easier to manage.   
Financing repairs and improvements with home equity is efficient for many borrowers.  But many 
first-time buyers in the last decade have lower-incomes, small savings and made low downpayments.  
Home equity as a share of 
house value has been 
declining for the last decade 
(chart).  First-time buyers 
often purchase lower cost, 
older homes, which are 
likely to require repairs or 
improvements in order to 
continue as viable units 
(Appendix Tables H and I).  
For borrowers without home 
equity, consumer loans or 
credit cards, which typically 
carry high rates and less 
flexible terms than home 
equity loans, are the only 
                                                          
87 "Remodeling Homes for Changing Households," Joint Center for Housing Studies, Harvard University, 1999. 
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option for making improvements or repairs.   
Moreover, borrowers seeking to finance a combination of acquisition and renovation work for 
distressed units typically face loan limits (based on estimates of the value of the completed work) below 
the total costs of conducting such work.  Scarce capital for these high loan-to-value loans, combined with  
high transaction costs, limit the use of these loan products.  
 
Policy Proposal:  Revise Title I Home Improvement Lending  Under the Title I program, FHAs 
oldest program, lending institutions make loans to finance eligible property improvements.  More than 35 
million property improvement loans have been backed by FHA, peaking in the 1950s with nearly 1 
million loans a year.  Today fewer than 20,000 Title I loans are backed annually.  The design and the 
management of the program are criticized for having too many restrictions, loan limits that are too low, 
and generally being slow and difficult to use.  Title I loans can be made directly to borrowers from 
lenders, or through dealers, where lenders provide financing but the loan is originated by a home 
improvement contractor.  Few lenders will process or originate these loans in either form, in part due to 
even higher administrative costs. Title I has been criticized for allowing undue agency risk; unethical 
borrowers, lenders and contractors can defraud FHA with false claims or projects.  FHA has sought to 
mitigate these risks, however, with recently released regulations.88  FHA should also consider increasing 
Title I loan limits from $25,000 to $50,000 and reduce the administrative hurdles involved with the 
program.  FHA could also make the insurance full-faith-and-credit, instead of being a conditional 
insurance.89 FHAs role in the market could help establish oversight and underwriting rules, however, 
which might help Ginnie Mae to re-enter this market. 
Policy Proposal:  Revise MRB Home Improvement Lending  Mortgage revenue bonds may be used 
for home improvement finance, but are limited to $15,000, a maximum unchanged since the MRB law 
was first passed.   By expanding tax-exempt bonding authority to high loan-to-value home improvement 
lending and acquisition-improvement, lenders will have access to lower-cost capital.  While such capital 
does not reduce the fixed costs of making or servicing these loans, the reduced interest rates will allow the 
consumer to borrow more, and include fees and points related to originating the loan.  Moreover, 
combined with FHA, as many MRB-backed loans are, the financing options for low-equity borrowers 
could be greatly expanded.  As such, the limit on MRB home improvement loans ought to be linked to the 
Title I loan level. 
Policy Proposal:  Enhance Secondary Market Role in Home Improvement Lending  If secondary 
market entities played a stronger role in home improvement lending, interest costs would likely be 
reduced.  Secondary markets to targeted high loan-to-value home improvement lending and acquisition-
improvement would also increase liquidity and affordability in these markets.  The GSEs should be 
encouraged to develop products in this arena, and affordable housing goals should recognize the added 
risk and necessary role of these loans in preserving low-income homeownership. 
 
E.) Preserving Homeownership for the Disadvantaged Homeowner   
Homeownership policy needs are not restricted to the conversion of renters to owners, but also include 
insuring homeowners successfully maintain their homes and remain current on mortgage, insurance and 
property tax payments.  Of nearly 70 million home-owning families, 27 million, representing more than 
57 million people, have incomes below 80 percent of area median. To the extent these households lack 
                                                          
88 Disbursements on dealer loans must be made either to the borrower only or jointly to the borrower and contractor, a telephone 
interview must be held with the borrower before funds are disbursed, dealer and lender net worth requirement were increased, 
and premiums were raised from 0.5 percent to 1 percent. 24 CFR Parts 201 and 202 in the Federal Register, Vol. 66, No. 216, 
November 7, 2001. 
89 Currently, as a conditional insurance, FHA can force lenders to buy back a loan, even after a claim was paid. 
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assets and income, they often struggle to afford mortgage payments, home repairs, taxes and other 
housing expenses. Of these 27 million low-income homeowners, 9.4 million are 70 years of age or older, 
and as the population ages in coming years, this number, and the needs of these homeowners will likely 
rise. Successful homeownership involves not only support for first-time homebuyers, but also for existing 
owners to maintain and preserve the asset in which they invested. Moreover, enhanced supports are 
needed to preserve gains in homeownership and the assets homes help families accrue in softer economic 
times. 
RHS direct subsidy programs and local HOME allocations can provide support for existing 
homeowners struggling to meet monthly mortgage payments or for home repairs.  These programs are 
critical for the millions of low-income families, especially elderly individuals in aging housing units, who 
have successfully qualified for a mortgage, but face hurdles of making payments or maintaining a safe 
and healthy home. 
Policy Proposal:  Developing a Preservation Focus  Just as policy makers, lenders, real estate 
professionals and community advocates have promoted expanding homeownership, an effort needs to be 
focused on making sure existing homeowners, lower-income, minorities, elderly and disabled, have 
access to services, loan products and advice they need to stay in their homes.  Financial literacy, home 
maintenance training, energy efficiency and weatherization programs are likely to be in greater demand in 
coming years.  Likewise, small repair projects, accessibility improvements and improved coordination 
between health care and housing will be required as more homeowners age. While not a specific proposal 
for any one agency or sector, the housing industry and housing advocates need to emphasize the 
importance of balancing resources for promoting first-time homeownership with strategies designed to 
preserve homeownership. 
 
F.) Re-focusing on Placed-Based Revitalization  
Homeownership can have a powerful impact on neighborhoods. Homeowners stay in a community up 
to four times longer than renters, establishing roots and social networks.  By joining community 
organizations, volunteering and even taking part in improvement activities like gardening, owners are a 
force for neighborhood improvement.90  Increasing investment in a neighborhood by owner-occupants can 
be a signal of confidence to other neighbors and the general marketplace.  Building and renovating single-
family units also has the potential to change the look of a neighborhood.  Numerous HOPE VI projects 
across the nation have demonstrated that innovative development packages can be created to increase 
homeownership rates in targeted areas.  Programs in other cities also have used homeownership as a tool 
to reinvigorate neighborhoods, often relying on partnerships between the public sector, private developers 
and nonprofit organizations.91  Comprehensive community development strategies have moved away a 
focus on providing affordable rental housing to encouraging mixed-income, well-designed projects, with 
a balance of rental and homeownership.  Such projects maximize the potential for asset building as 
property value appreciate.  
Policy Proposal:  Comprehensive Homeownership Strategies  As other communities design 
revitalization programs centered on homeownership, it is becoming clear that neighborhood impact 
depends on more than just owner-occupancy.  Several factors appear to be significant.  First, programs 
need to be geographically concentrated to have an impact on supply or demand for housing in a 
neighborhood.  One hundred new homebuyers in a 1,000 square block area is unlikely to have an impact 
on choices and confidence in the market; 10 new homebuyers on one block might.  Second, homebuyer 
programs should not forsake physical improvements, such as appropriate facades and landscaping, in a 
quest for affordability.  By focusing on improving the aesthetic environment of a neighborhood, existing 
                                                          
90 Denise DiPasquale and Edward L. Glaeser, Incentives and Social Capital: Are Home Owners Better Citizens? Joint Center 
For Housing Studies Working paper W97-3, 1997. 
91 See Charles J. Orlebeke, New Life at Ground Zero: New York, Home Ownership, and the Future of American Cities, 1997. 
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property owners will be more likely to make further investments in an area.  Third, homebuyer counseling 
and lending programs should not consider the goal to be for every customer to buy a home, but rather help 
families prepare to own and maintain a home, as well as manage a mortgage for many years.  By also 
training prospective first-time homebuyers about community involvement and leadership, the 
neighborhood becomes a place where families not only choose to live but also become socially invested.  
Fourth, homebuyer programs seeking to revitalize neighborhoods should encourage and seek out a 
diversity of new and existing residents.  Stable neighborhoods include families of various income levels, 
racial backgrounds and age ranges.  By making a neighborhood attractive to many groups of residents, the 
potential homebuyer market for an area expands significantly, as does an area's cultural attributes and 
political clout.  Fifth, revitalization strategies must recognize neighborhood image is crucial in real estate 
markets.  By involving real estate professionals, lenders and the media in outreach efforts, a 
neighborhood's image can be improved, generating demand for the area.  While not a comprehensive list, 
the impact of rising homeownership rates will be leveraged to the extent these components are in place. 
Coordination of such efforts, absent HOPE VI or other funder-driven programs, is difficult, because it 
requires strong local leadership over a number of years.  As homeownership efforts are developed, 
mechanisms to help residents to develop a long-term vision to improve an arearather than simply to 
promote home salescan result in more stable neighborhoods with improved opportunities for 
appreciation.   
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SECTION 6: OPPORTUNITIES IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM FOR HOMEOWNERSHIP POLICIES 
This paper has attempted to provide an overview of issues related to homeownership policy.  While 
not a thorough description of every federal policy, issues identified through interviews, focus groups, and 
comment letters to the Millennial Housing Commission are outlined.  Five barriers to homeownership are 
described: income, wealth, credit, information and supply, each of which is addressed by existing 
policies, but require further attention.  Proposals for new or modified policies are grouped into three 
general categories: (I.) expanding the reach of mortgage markets for sustainable homeownership; (II.) 
educating and protecting consumers engaged in mortgage and home equity markets; and (III.) production 
and preservation of units suitable for affordable homeownership. To these ends, the Millennial Housing 
Commission should consider the following 10 priorities: 
1.  Create a new tax credit to support homeownership. 
The existing tax code provides little support for low-income homebuyers.  A blended, flexible 
new tax credit should be created, allocated by state housing agencies for either pre-paid mortgage 
points for deeply-subsidized loans or to bridge appraisal gaps in the development of owner-
occupied homes.  All credits would be taken in one year only, the year in which the project is 
completed or the loan is originated.  The total amount could be carried-over for up to three years if 
tax liabilities in the base year do not exceed the amount of the credit.  Credits could also be 
transferable if the credit purchaser has insufficient tax liabilities.  Only first-time buyers below 80 
percent of area median income (using HUD-income-adjusted guidelines) would be eligible 
beneficiaries, regardless of location.   
Tax-credit loans could not be pre-paid except in the case of a sale, and loans would not be 
assumable.  Units developed with an appraisal gap tax credit would be sold to income qualified 
owner-occupant buyers.  Violations of these rules would be subject to a recapture of the tax credit 
from the investor, for up to ten years.92  Using the supply-side credit, market values would need 
careful appraisals if no comparable sales exist.  Using the demand-side credit, lenders would be 
required to underwrite loans within clear guidelines regarding minimum and maximum ratios, as 
well as home purchase price. 
This credit provides state agencies with flexibility to address the issues facing buyers in a 
particular market.  Allocating agencies in tighter markets could focus on building supply; agencies 
softer markets could work on stimulating demand.  Both credits would use similar requirements 
and processes.  It is unlikely this new credit will substitute or undermine the existing rental LIHTC 
due to differences in the term and risk, as well as the nearly unlimited appetite of investors seeking 
tax relief. 
2.  Revise the statutes of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to increase its 
flexibility and ability to serve low-income homeowners and communities. 
FHA is at risk of becoming a dinosaur in the market place.  Proposals suggesting FHA could be 
restructured as a more independent agency, as it was prior to 1968, deserve serious review.  
Freeing FHA from the miasma of HUDs procurement and personnel regulations, however, is not 
a cure-all.  FHA also needs Congress to grant it increased flexibility to experiment with private-
sector partnerships.  While FHA can absorb risk better than any private-market player, it has not 
proven nimble at pricing its products, streamlining originations, or managing properties in default.  
Private-sector institutions have nearly perfected fast and efficient systems to handle all of these 
tasks.   FHA has begun to outsource many of its functions to private contractors, but the 
structure of these relationships places oversight burdens on FHA and creates few incentives for 
                                                          
92 It is likely a lien would need to be place on the property to enforce these restrictions. 
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contractors to outperform contractual requirements.  By entering into true partnerships, where risks 
and revenues are shared, FHA could take advantage of the operational efficiencies of the private 
sector.  In addition to greater efficiency, private partners may open up new delivery channels not 
served by the handful of lenders originating the majority of FHA-endorsed loans currently.  
Improving the speed of FHA services and minimizing the harm caused by ineffective disposition 
efforts may justify these partnership structures even if they reduce federal revenues compared to 
the present structure. 
3.  Expand support for homebuyer education and counseling. 
Lenders, borrowers and communities benefit when consumers are better informed about their 
rights and responsibilities in the mortgage transaction. Support for homebuyer education and 
counseling from the federal government is crucial to the expansion of this practice.  HUDs 
counseling budget is small relative to the market, small relative to HUDs budget, and should be 
increased.  However, administration of these funds needs improvement.  HUD regulations 
prohibiting clients from paying a fee, and prohibiting lenders and real estate agents from partially 
covering fees for homebuyer services, should also be changed.  A matching grant mechanism 
leveraging private-sector contributions and sliding scale fees should also be established.  
Disclosure of the provider and cost of education should be included on HUD-1 settlement 
documents.  As much as possible, the provision pre-purchase counseling should be mainstreamed 
into the homebuying process.  Counseling should also be required in some circumstances, such as 
borrowers seeking high-cost loans.  HUD and state housing agencies should work to build the 
capacity of the delivery system for homebuyer education with grants and other support for 
nonprofits and other providers.  Other programs, especially state housing finance agencies, should 
be directed to review opportunities for integrating reasonable incentives for consumers and 
industry to include counseling and education in the home buying process, including discounts in 
rates and fees.  Fees for counseling should be an allowable cost that can be financed into a 
mortgage, and such fees should not count against HOEPA limits.  Finally, HUD, the Federal 
Reserve Board and other federal agencies should work together to establish minimum standards 
for homebuyer counseling and education. 
4.  Expand tax-exempt mortgage revenue bond (MRB) programs used by state 
housing finance agencies. 
Mortgage revenue bonds have proven an effective tool for expanding the reach of mortgage 
markets, increasing affordability and allowing more flexible underwriting, targeted to lower-
income first-time homebuyers.  Legislation should be passed changing the loan limit regulations 
to become a multiple of HUD area median incomes, or another simply administered formula, 
automatically adjusted over time.  The so-called ten-year rule should also be repealed, allowing 
more mortgages to be issued under the existing private activity bond cap.   
5.  Encourage and expand sharing of data related to home buying and lending. 
Recent revisions on HMDA data provide even more transparency to the homebuying process, 
but access to these data by community groups, consumers and researchers through the FFIEC 
could be improved. Likewise access to HUDs datasets concerning GSE and private mortgage 
insurance, as well as data potentially collected from HUD-1 closing forms should be examined 
for opportunities to increase dissemination and use.  These agencies should be directed to review 
their current data dissemination initiatives and invest in improvements which enhance usability. 
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6.  Improve treatment of manufactured housing in financial and real estate 
markets. 
The manufactured home industry has evolved in the last decade, despite some considerable 
growing pains, to deliver an increasingly quality product that meets the needs of consumers.  Five 
actions will improve access of manufactured homeowners and buyers to capital markets.  First, 
Congress should affirm Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac can purchase manufactured home loans 
classified as personal property, require these GSEs to support a secondary market for such loans, 
and direct HUD to establish performance goals for manufactured home loan purchases.  Second, 
FHA manufactured housing loan programs need to be improved and promoted.  Loan limits and 
terms need to be revised and Ginnie Mae needs to approve more issuer/servicers or instruct 
existing issuers to issue and service manufactured home loans.  Third, RHS loan programs should 
be revised to allow personal property loans for re-sales and replacement of existing manufactured 
homes.  Fourth, barriers to placing manufactured units in urban or other developments should be 
reduced, including federal subsidized affordable projects.  Finally, those states that do not 
recognize manufactured homes on leased land as real estate to change their laws, as well as to 
offer tenants in leased-land communities the right of first-refusal when their community is up for 
sale. 
7.  Improve home improvement lending for low-wealth homebuyers. 
Borrowers without home equity need affordable sources of home improvement loans to sustain 
homeownership.  FHA Title I should be simplified, loan limits should be increased from $25,000 
to $50,000 and making the insurance full-faith-and-credit, instead of a conditional insurance, 
should be explored.  Likewise, mortgage revenue bonds should be revised for use in home 
improvement finance.  Loan limits should be linked to Title I, and use of the program should be 
encouraged by state housing agencies. 
8.  Encourage GSEsincluding Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, the Federal Home Loan 
Banks and Ginnie Maeas a significant source of innovation in the 
mortgage market. 
These GSEs should use their power in the secondary market to increase standardization in 
markets, especially in subprime lending, home improvement lending, acquisition and 
development finance, and manufactured housing lending. 
9.  Revise consumer disclosure and protection laws to better inform homebuyers 
of their rights, responsibilities, and options. 
A renewed effort is needed by HUD and the Federal Reserve to revise RESPA and TILA to 
make disclosures simpler and more reliable, while also increasing cost-efficiency of closing and 
settlement.  HUD should also establish a central depository for HUD-1 settlement form data, 
using the data to establish benchmark costs and fees, as well as to analyze anomalies in practices.  
TILA should also be revised to require lenders to disclose to borrowers all of the products a 
lender and its subsidiaries offer, to help marginal mortgage loan applicants know if they are being 
tracked into high-cost subprime subsidiaries or loan products when they could afford 
conventional products.  
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10. Promote financial literacy, including the use of IDAs and First Accounts by 
local entities, as well as post-purchase maintenance and resident-
leadership training. 
To the extent extending homeownership to low- and very-low income people is a priority, 
correlated issues of banking, personal financial management and financial literacy cannot be 
ignored.  Housing policies and programs need to focus on strategies for teaching economic 
literacy and helping families maintain their homes and their finances.  IDAs and First Accounts 
help lower-income families establish traditional banking relationships and improve their credit 
ratings and should be expanded, particularly through state programs, foundations and nonprofits.  
Likewise, existing homeowners need more access to training on how to maintain their home, as 
well as support to lead community improvement activities. 
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SECTION 7: CONCLUSIONS 
Buying a home is typically the largest and most complicated financial commitment most households 
ever make.  Would-be first-time buyers face a series of hurdles before they can become successful 
homeowners.  From finding a unit in a desirable location to qualifying for a mortgage, many first-time 
buyers lack information, are intimidated or even misled.  These hurdles work in combination, especially 
among low-income and minority populations, to continue to keep homeownership out of reach for 
portions of society. 
American housing policy has developed many successful programs to support the development of 
affordable rental units, as well as to provide subsidies for low-income renters.  Far fewer federal policies 
are targeted to low-income homeowners or potential homeowners.  The largest existing federal policy 
supporting homeownership is the personal income tax deductibility of mortgage interest and real estate 
taxes, but it is poorly targeted toward helping the families least likely to buy homes into the market.  Tax 
exempt financing of mortgage revenue bonds has proven a powerful tool to provide below-market rate 
mortgage products targeted to first-time homebuyers.  However, because many buyers require credit 
enhancements which add costs to monthly payments, such as mortgage insurance, many first-time buyers 
still need deeper interest rate subsidies than typically can be offered by mortgage revenue bonds. 
The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) has helped million of homebuyers by providing 
government insurance guarantees to lenders making loans to qualified buyers.  Yet, FHAs market and 
role is shifting as private-sector lenders have created innovative ways to reach underserved markets.   
The impact of federal policies supporting the expansion of access to credit, such as the Community 
Reinvestment Act (CRA) and Fair Housing Act, should not be underestimated.  Combined with oversight 
of government-sponsored entities, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and the Federal Home Loan Banks, these 
institutions have power to establish and shape entire markets. Even federal regulations regarding 
consumer protection and disclosure, such as RESPA, TILA HMDA, and HOEPA, provide needed 
transparency and accountability to homeownership transactions.   
Currently, too few first-time homebuyers receive pre-purchase education and counseling, but recent 
research indicates existing programs providing support for such services are crucial for sustainable 
homeownership.  Ensuring current and potential homebuyers have objective and accurate information is 
critical to their success. 
Although homes are being constructed in record numbers, the market is increasingly bifurcated 
between higher cost site-built homes and highly-affordable manufactured homes.  Manufactured homes 
offer great potential for low-income homebuyers, but programs serving this market need to be revised to 
better serve consumers, as well as provide loans at lower costs. 
Recent increases in mortgage loan delinquencies and bankruptcies reaffirms the concept that programs 
and policies must focus not just on getting families into homeownership, but creating successful lifetime 
homeowners.  Similarly, policies that support the preservation and improvement of the owner-occupied 
stock need to be supported to ensure the continuance of a quality supply of units.  Moreover, many 
production programs neglect to consider the potential for broader neighborhood and community 
improvement. 
As the Millennial Housing Commission considers its housing policy recommendations, 
homeownership, from mortgage finance, to consumer education and protection to production and 
preservation, is a central, but complicated issue.  Despite the concerns that exist, the U.S. has been 
remarkably successful in helping two out of every three families become homeowners.  With revisions to 
existing policies, and a few new programs, the Commission can help even more families pursue the 
American dream of homeownership. 
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APPENDIX TABLES: 
 
TABLE A: Homeownership Rates by Race and Education 
Homeowners as a Share of Households 
 All Married Households Under Age 50 
 Less Than 
12th Grade
High School 
Graduate 
Bachelors of 
Higher 
White 67.1% 81.7% 86.6% 
African American 48.9% 61.8% 66.8% 
Native 44.9% 58.6% 60.7% 
Asian/Pacific 47.1% 67.0% 61.4% 
Other 20.4% 55.0% 61.2% 
Latino * 40.8% 51.8% 69.1% 
Any respondent stating of Hispanic origin is considered Latino 
regardless if another race was indicated 
Source: 1999 American Housing Survey, authors tabulations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE B: FHA Portfolio Profile 
 
FHA Portfolio July 2001 
Loans Value % change 
from prior 
year 
Single Family Insured 6,633,241 $498.8 -2.4% 
Multifamily Insured 14,705 54.2 0.9 
Title I Property Improvement Insured  184,696 2.6 -23.8 
Title I Manufactured Housing Insured  53,835 1.3 -15.8 
Single Family Notes * 1,067 - -89.4 
Multifamily Notes * 1,541 2.6 -6.1 
Title I Notes * 39,133 .5 -7.8 
Single-Family Properties (FHA owned) 29,713 2.6 -19.6 
Multifamily Properties (FHA owned) 62 .2 0.9 
* Assignment programs 
Source: FHA Commissioners Report <www.hud.gov> 
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TABLE C:  Legislative Proposals Regarding Predatory Lending 2000-2001 
Bill 
(Congressional 
 Session) 
Target(s) for 
Amendments 
Prohibitions 
(example) 
 
Requirements 
(example) 
Other 
H.R. 1051 
(107 Cong) 
HOEPA Limits prepayment 
penalties; prohibits 
balloon payments on 
HOEPA loans; -
prohibits any credit 
insurance or single 
premium products; 
lower HOEPA interest 
rate trigger 
Consumers receive 
warnings on the risks 
of HOEPA loans, the 
need for credit 
counseling and a list of 
local certified credit 
counselors.  
 
Provides increased reparations for 
consumers and enforcement of 
consumer protections; prohibits 
mandatory arbitration. 
 
 
H.R. 2531 
(107 Cong) 
HOEPA, TILA, 
HMDA 
See above; Also, 
coercion of appraisers; 
prohibits underwriting 
without regard to ability 
to pay. 
APR, points and fees 
in HMDA; Expanded 
HMDA coverage; 
Requirement for 
counseling for HOEPA 
Makes lender/creditor liable for 
mortgage brokers actions; prohibits 
mandatory arbitration. 
H.R. 3901 
(106 Cong) 
 
TILA, HOEPA, 
HMDA 
Prepayment penalties; 
negative amortization; 
single premium credit 
life insurance. 
APR in HMDA Excludes participation of high-cost 
loans from MBS pools; sets forth 
penalties for noncompliance 
H.R. 2405 
(106 Cong) 
 
TILA, HOEPA Prepayment penalties; 
negative amortization; 
single premium credit 
life insurance, 
mandatory arbitration. 
Lowers APR threshold  
H.R. 4250 
(106 Cong) 
 
TILA, HOEPA  
See above 
 
See above 
Strengthens civil penalties for 
consumers. 
S. 2415 
(106 Cong) 
 
TILA See above.  Prepayment 
penalties within first 24 
months.  
Additional disclosures.  
H.R. 4213 
(106 Cong) 
 
RESPA, TILA  Itemization of all 
charges imposed on 
buyer/sellers.  
Requires disclosure of mortgage 
broker fees and compensation. 
 
04/11/02 Homeownership and the Role of Federal Housing Policy 57 
 
TABLE D: Secondary Market Sales by Institution Type 
Type of Seller Institution  1995 Fannie Mae Freddie Mac 
       Mortgage Company 68.0% 58.9% 
       Thrift 17.7% 24.0% 
       Bank 11.1% 16.3% 
       Other 3.3% 0.7% 
Source:  HUD analysis of GSE loan-level data on single-family 
one-unit mortgages.  Both home purchase and refinance 
mortgages are included. 
 
 
TABLE E: Mortgage Insurance 
Year FHA Private 
Mortgage 
Insurance 
Total Percent FHA 
1980 381,169 392,808 775,957 49% 
1981 224,829 334,565 561,375 40% 
1982 166,734 315,868 484,584 34% 
1983 503,425 652,214 1,157,622 43% 
1984 267,831 946,408 1,216,223 22% 
1985 409,547 729,597 1,141,129 36% 
1986 921,370 585,987 1,509,343 61% 
1987 1,319,987 511,058 1,833,032 72% 
1988 698,990 423,470 1,124,448 62% 
1989 726,359 365,497 1,093,845 66% 
1990 780,329 367,120 1,149,439 68% 
1991 685,905 494,259 1,182,155 58% 
1992 680,278 907,511 1,589,781 43% 
1993 1,065,832 1,198,307 2,266,132 47% 
1994 1,217,685 1,148,696 2,368,375 51% 
1995 568,399 960,756 1,531,150 37% 
1996 849,861 1,068,707 1,920,564 44% 
1997 839,712 974,698 1,816,407 46% 
1998 1,110,530 1,473,344 2,585,872 43% 
1999 1,246,433 1,455,403 2,703,835 46% 
2000 891,874 1,236,214 2,130,088 42% 
Source: HUD US Housing Markets 
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TABLE F: Homebuyer Location 
 
Share of First Time Homebuyers by Income and Metro Status 
Percent of total first-time buyers in income range (row) 
 
  Central City   Suburb   Nonmetro  
 1985 1999 1985 1999 1985 1999 
< 30% AMI 21% 33% 46% 43% 33% 24% 
30.1 - 50% AMI 21% 28% 47% 53% 32% 19% 
50.1 - 60% AMI 23% 29% 48% 56% 29% 15% 
60.1 - 80% AMI 21% 29% 55% 54% 24% 16% 
80.1 - 100% AMI 22% 28% 55% 51% 22% 21% 
100.1 - 120% AMI 19% 29% 57% 56% 25% 15% 
120% AMI + 26% 26% 55% 54% 19% 20% 
Total 23% 28% 54% 53% 23% 19% 
Tabulations of American Housing Survey by David A. Vandenbroucke, HUD 
 
 
 
TABLE G: HMDA Purchase Loan Volume by Lender Type 
1-4 Unit Home Purchase Loans (in thousands) 
All Loans 
Lender Type 1993 2000 Percent 
Growth 
Net Increase Share of 
growth 
Conventional Prime 1,695 2,581 52% 886 69% 
FHA/RHS/VA 651 763 17% 112 9% 
Subprime 31 236 661% 205 16% 
Manufactured Housing 37 120 224% 83 6% 
Total 2,414 3,700 53% 1,286 100% 
      
Purchase Loans to Borrowers Below 80% of Area Median Income 
Lender Type 1993 2000 Percent 
Growth 
Net Increase Share of 
growth 
Conventional Prime 331 563 70% 232 50% 
FHA/RHS/VA 245 346 41% 101 22% 
Subprime 8 82 925% 74 16% 
Manufactured Housing 21 75 257% 54 12% 
Total 605 1,066 76% 461 100% 
Note: only for MSAs, as defined by boundaries as of 1990 Census.  
Loans to borrowers <80% AMI anywhere and loans to anyone in LMI areas (where LMI area is defined 
by tract median income to MSA median as of 1990 Census). 
Source:  Joint Center for Housing Studies tabulations of 1993 and 2000 HMDA data. 
 
TABLE H: Age of Homes Purchased by First-Time Buyers 
Age of Homes Percent of Total by Decade - First Time Buyers 
 All Very Low 
Income (Less 
than 50%) 
Low Income 
(51% to 80%)
Moderate 
Income (81% 
to 120%) 
High Income 
(Over 120%) 
Pre 1920 10.3% 13.8% 10.0% 10.0% 8.1% 
1920 12.6% 15.1% 13.0% 13.0% 10.5% 
1930 9.4% 13.1% 10.4% 8.1% 7.2% 
1940 16.2% 18.3% 17.6% 15.9% 14.3% 
1950 14.0% 12.8% 14.1% 13.6% 14.9% 
1960 8.1% 7.5% 8.0% 8.0% 8.6% 
1970 12.3% 9.1% 12.4% 12.6% 14.4% 
1980 6.7% 3.9% 6.0% 6.8% 8.9% 
1990 10.4% 6.5% 8.5% 12.1% 12.9% 
Source: 1999 American Housing Survey, authors tabulations 
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TABLE I: Units Purchased by First-Time Buyers 
Units Recently Purchased (1997 to 1999) 
  All First-Time 
Buyers 
First-Time Buyers 
with Incomes Below 
80% of Area Median
Median Value $ 90,000 $65,000 
Median Decade Built 1970 1960 
Percent Inadequate 5.6% 8.3% 
Percent Manufactured Homes 14.2% 20.6% 
Percent Single family 90.5% 89.7% 
Unit Average Square Footage 1,729 1,493 
Source: 1999 American Housing Survey, authors tabulations 
 
TABLE J:  Homeownership Rates by Income and Region, Including Manufactured Housing 
 1997 1999 
All Regions Owner-
Occupied 
Units (000) 
Homeowner-
ship Rate 
Percent 
Mobile 
Homes 
Owner-
Occupied 
Units (000)
Homeowner-
ship Rate 
Percent 
Mobile 
Homes 
< 50% Area Median 16,622 47% 8.4% 15,517 48% 8.7% 
50-80% Area Median 10,753 60% 8.1% 11,338 59% 7.2% 
80-120% Area Median 13,142 74% 7.0% 12,791 72% 7.6% 
 120% or more 24,958 88% 3.1% 29,134 88% 3.6% 
Northeast -   -   
< 50% Area Median 3,190 44% 4.2% 2,911 44% 4.3% 
50-80% Area Median 1,904 56% 3.7% 1,872 53% 3.2% 
80-120% Area Median 2,429 72% 3.1% 2,361 71% 2.4% 
 120% or more 4,716 87% 1.0% 5,497 86% 1.4% 
Midwest (North Central) -   -   
< 50% Area Median 3,956 50% 5.9% 3,854 52% 6.9% 
50-80% Area Median 3,056 65% 7.5% 3,039 65% 5.4% 
80-120% Area Median 3,658 80% 4.2% 3,413 79% 5.7% 
 120% or more 6,229 92% 2.1% 7,259 92% 2.1% 
South -   -   
< 50% Area Median 6,599 53% 12.6% 5,953 52% 12.8% 
50-80% Area Median 3,747 62% 11.4% 4,246 62% 11.1% 
80-120% Area Median 4,431 73% 11.9% 4,588 72% 12.5% 
 120% or more 8,868 88% 4.7% 10,400 88% 6.2% 
West -   -   
< 50% Area Median 2,877 38% 8.1% 2,799 39% 8.1% 
50-80% Area Median 2,046 54% 7.3% 2,181 52% 6.3% 
80-120% Area Median 2,623 70% 6.2% 2,430 65% 6.4% 
 120% or more 5,145 84% 3.1% 5,991 85% 3.1% 
Source: 1997 and 1999 American Housing Surveys 
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TABLE K: Placements of Manufactured Units 1994 and 1999 by Region 
 1994 1999 
US Total Total Single Double % Double Total Single Double % Double
Titled as Personal Property 260,000 140,000 116,000 45% 274,000 105,000 167,000 61% 
Titled as Real Estate 27,000 7,000 19,000 70% 54,000 13,000 40,000 74% 
Percent Real Estate 9% 5% 14%  16% 11% 19%  
Not Titled 4,000 2,000 2,000  10,000 4,000 7,000  
Total Placements 291,000 149,000 137,000 47% 338,000 122,000 214,000 63% 
Northeast         
Titled as Personal Property 14,000 8,000 16,000 114% 11,000 3,000 7,000 64% 
Titled as Real Estate 2,000 1,000 1,000 50% 3,000 1,000 2,000 67% 
Percent Real Estate 13% 11% 14%  21% 25% 22%  
Not Titled 0    0 0 0  
Total Placements 16,000 9,000 7,000 44% 14,000 4,000 9,000 64% 
Midwest         
Titled as Personal Property 45,000 26,000 19,000 42% 39,000 15,000 24,000 62% 
Titled as Real Estate 8,000 2,000 6,000 75% 12,000 3,000 10,000 83% 
Percent Real Estate 15% 7% 24%  23% 16% 29%  
Not Titled 0 0 0  1,000 1,000 1,000  
Total Placements 53,000 28,000 25,000 47% 52,000 19,000 35,000 67% 
South         
Titled as Personal Property 165,000 96,000 67,000 41% 194,000 81,000 112,000 58% 
Titled as Real Estate 10,000 4,000 6,000 60% 27,000 8,000 19,000 70% 
Percent Real Estate 6% 4% 8%  12% 9% 14%  
Not Titled 3,000 1,000 1,000  7,000 3,000 5,000  
Total Placements 178,000 101,000 75,000 42% 229,000 93,000 135,000 59% 
West         
Titled as Personal Property 36,000 11,000 24,000 67% 30,000 6,000 24,000 80% 
Titled as Real Estate 7,000 1,000 6,000 86% 11,000 1,000 10,000 91% 
Percent Real Estate 16% 9% 20%  26% 14% 29%  
Not Titled 0 0 0  1,000 0 1,000  
Total Placements 44,000 11,000 30,000 68% 43,000 7,000 35,000 81% 
Source: Census construction series 
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FIGURE A: Subprime FICO Scores 
Source: Office of Thrift Supervision Analysis of Mortgage Information Corporation Data 
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